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THE EFFECTS OF THE THIRD REFORM ACT ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND 
ORGANIZATION IN INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN, 1886-1906 
 
 
An Abstract of the Thesis By 
Michael S. Vernon 
 
 
 The Third Reform Act doubled the size of the British electorate by extending the 
urban franchise reform of 1867 into the counties. The Act also called for a redistribution 
of seats in Parliament which eliminated most multi-member constituencies and replace 
them with single-member constituencies. These reforms changed the political landscape 
resulting in a more democratic electorate. The twenty years following the Third Reform 
Act are characterized by a Conservative ascendancy, which saw Conservatives take power 
and control British politics for the next generation. This Conservative ascendancy was 
possible because of the increased importance of public opinion in the electoral calculus of 
British politics. The Conservative party effectively appealed to new voters and formed a 
broad coalition around maintaining the status-quo, while the Liberal party failed to build a 
comparable coalition and instead advocated for social reforms that were unpopular outside 
of faddist pressure groups. The Liberal party split over Gladstone’s support of Irish Home 
Rule enabled the Conservative party to take power following the 1886 general election and 
remain the dominant party until 1906. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The Third Reform Act which necessitated a general election in 1885 had a 
significant impact on the course of British politics in the late Victorian period. The size of 
the electorate was more than doubled, and parliamentary representation was redistributed 
with the creation of single-member constituencies, ushering in a more democratic 
political process. The two general elections following the Third Reform Act resulted in 
the Liberal party losing seats in 1885 and falling out of power in 1886. Conservatives 
ascended to control of parliament following the 1886 general election and dominated 
British politics for the following generation. 
This thesis argues that the Conservative ascendancy was possible due to the more 
democratic nature of the electorate after the Third Reform Act. The increased political 
organization and activity amongst all classes greatly enhanced the role of public opinion 
in electoral politics. This is seen in the 1885 general election, the first following the 
passage of the Third Reform Act. In this election, the Liberal party lost seats compared to 
the 1880 election. This loss of seats was due to the Liberal party’s failure to effectively 
organize their base and their support of unpopular social reform campaigns. Although the 
Liberal party lost seats in 1885, they maintained their position as the governing party as 
Irish Nationalists aligned with the Liberals because of their support of Irish Home Rule. 
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However, Irish Home Rule split the Liberal party in 1886 and swept them out of power. 
While the Irish Home Rule crisis played a major role in the electoral defeat for the 
Liberal party, it was also indicative of their inability to appeal to the ideals of the 
electorate. The Conservative party, in large part, did not suffer from this problem. Their 
party organizations successfully appealed to the ideals of several classes of voters, such 
as national identity among the working-class, and defense of property among the middle-
class, to bolster Conservative electoral support. It was this organizational strength of the 
Conservative party, and the collapse of the Liberal party that created the Conservative 
ascendancy of 1886-1906. 
The Third Reform Act brought the total British electorate to over five and a half 
million voters, while also redistributing seats in Parliament. Although commonly referred 
to as a single reform, the Third Reform Act is two distinct reforms which combined to 
alter the British political system. The Representation of the People Act, 1884 granted an 
extension of household suffrage into all counties of Britain.1 That act also eliminated the 
multiple voter eligibilities for a single individual within a single district.2 While the 
largest effect of the Representation of the People Act, 1884 was felt in the counties of 
Britain, the 1880s were not without significant change for the boroughs as well. The other 
half of the Third Reform Act, officially known as the Redistribution of Seats Act 1885, 
achieved that change by redistributing parliamentary seats and establishing the modern 
system of single-member constituencies.3  
                                                          
1 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The Representation of the People 
Act, 1884, Oxford University, 1. 
2 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The Representation of the People 
Act, 1884, Oxford University, 2. 
3 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. House of Commons. The Redistribution of Seats Act 
1885, Archive, 1. 
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The division of previously multi-member constituencies into single-member 
constituencies allowed for more concise electoral battles between Liberals and 
Conservatives, as well as inter-party conflicts. The increased electorate and redistributed 
parliamentary seats of the Third Reform Act bolstered political activity and organization 
across all classes, and saw public opinion play a greatly enhanced role in electoral 
politics in the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods. 
  Over the course of the nineteenth century, British politics became increasingly 
democratic as Parliament introduced a wave of reforms increasing the size of the 
electorate and reconfiguring the distribution of parliamentary seats. The Third Reform 
Act of 1884-5 was the most significant of these nineteenth century reforms, bringing the 
total electorate to five and a half million voters, and establishing the single member 
constituency. The largest increase in electoral numbers came from the counties, which 
received the same voter qualifications as burghs received in the Second Reform Act of 
1867. The Third Reform Act had a significant impact on burghs as well, as the creation of 
single member districts allowed for a more concise electoral fight between Liberals and 
Conservatives. This thesis argues that the Third Reform Act bolstered political 
organization and activity amongst all classes, creating a government that saw following 
public opinion as vital to remaining electorally relevant. 
 Before any examination of the effects of the Third Reform Act can be properly 
undertaken, it is prudent to first examine the state of British politics before the reforms in 
question. Prior to the Third Reform Act, the nineteenth century saw two major 
parliamentary reforms, in 1832 and 1867. The First Reform Act came about because the 
nineteenth century saw the importance of agriculture wane, and the traditional method of 
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electing the Commons was no longer practical, as the general interests of Britain were no 
longer being represented. As Britain’s economic interests shifted towards the industrial 
urban centers it became apparent that parliament as then constructed offered a severely 
disproportionate representation of the population.4  
 According to Jonathan Parry, the Great Reform Act became a natural issue for the 
Whigs to support because of their hostility to Tory exclusiveness, and the extravagance 
and corruption of Tory ministers.5 Parry also makes the argument that the Whigs made 
prototypical appeals to public opinion in their campaign for the Reform Act, stating:  
The early nineteenth century saw a sea-change in the relationship between 
whiggery and public opinion. On the one hand, many small borough patrons 
defected to government during the war. On the other, the unpopularity of 
government, especially after 1806 transformed whig fortunes…The whigs’ 
calls for low taxation, opposition to repressive legislation, and criticism of the 
Regent’s extravagance and influence gave them a much higher profile and 
popularity in the country…Nothing distinguished whigs from tories more 
than the former’s willingness to rouse popular agitation.6 
 
According to Parry, the Whigs supported the Reform Act because of their growing 
popularity in the country and because of postwar discontent.7 Although there was initial 
Tory opposition to the notion of parliamentary reform, long-held anxiety over the French 
Revolution ultimately led to pressure both from above and below to reform the 
parliamentary system.8 According to Toke S. Aidt and Raphael Franck, the support 
received by Whigs and Radicals in the 1831 general election, the last before the Great 
Reform and generally viewed as a referendum on the Reform Bill, came from voters in 
                                                          
4 Stephen J Lee, Aspects of British Political History 1815-1914 (London: Routledge, 1994), 54. 
5Jonathan Parry, The Rise and the Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 74. 
6 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 74-6. 
7 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 76. 
8 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 54. 
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constituencies hit particularly hard by the 1831 Swing Riots.9 This pressure, however, 
should not be interpreted as a call for democracy. Aidt and Franck make this argument in 
claiming that the riots were not concentrated in areas with a strong underlying support for 
reform, and that the most likely cause of the riots was instead the harsh socio-economic 
deprivation in rural areas in general and the poor harvests of 1828-29 in general, as 
evidenced by the frequency with which threshing machines were destroyed as a protest 
against the deteriorated conditions for agricultural laborers.10 Thus, rather than being an 
outright movement towards democracy, the reforms were aimed at bringing new groups 
into the existing arena of power instead of handing power over to them directly.11 As 
such, the 1832 Reform Act was a defensive measure to placate extra parliamentary 
forces.12 To those already in power, the best method of preserving their power without 
creating unrest by ignoring calls for reform was to grant the franchise to the middle 
classes, which represented the industrial ownership.13 This reform, which was given royal 
assent in June 1832 expanded the franchise to include middle class men, but did not 
change the number of seats in the House of Commons, with only 143 of 658 seats being 
redistributed.14 
 Despite the unprecedented extent of the 1832 Reform Act, it was still relatively 
limited in impact on a grand scale, with less than fifteen percent of British men being 
eligible to vote and seats in the Commons still unequally distributed.15 Thomas Ertman 
                                                          
9 Toke S. Aidt and Raphael Franck, “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the 
Great Reform Act of 1832,” Econometrica 83, no. 2 (2015): 508. 
10 Aidt and Franck, “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution,” 513-4. 
11 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 54. 
12 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 73. 
13 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 56. 
14 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 58. 
15 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 59. 
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however gives a generally favorable review of the Great Reform Act, arguing that it 
leaves three long-term consequences which, he argues, continue to resonate more than a 
century later.16 The first of those consequences was the arrival of truly national, 
participatory politics. According to Ertman and John Phillips, the agitation for reform 
around the First Reform Act united ordinary people across Britain in political debates and 
lobbying.17 The second consequence was the consolidation of a two-party system based 
around religious preference, with Tories/Conservatives primarily consisting of Anglicans 
and Whigs/Liberals the preferred party of Dissenters. The elimination of nomination 
boroughs meant that governments could no longer depend on them to return majorities to 
Parliament, and therefore necessitated the growth of political party organizations to 
ensure support among the constituencies.18 Finally, Ertman argues that the relatively 
exclusive nature of the First Reform Act produced lasting consequences for British 
politics as it sowed the seeds of future parliamentary reforms over the course of the 
following century: 
[The] act contained within it the seed of the future reforms of 1867, 1884-
1885, and 1918 because it still excluded the great majority of the adult 
population from the vote. Furthermore, the use of a uniform (and arbitrary) 
property value of £10 as the main electoral qualification in the boroughs in 
the face of great variations in the level of rents across the country meant that 
men who were well down the social scale but lived in expensive cities such 
as London obtained the vote whereas those similarly situated but living 
elsewhere did not (Hilton, 2006, p. 434). At the same time, the act provided a 
model for overcoming such inherent tensions and contradictions through a 
gradual lowering of electoral qualifications that, because they were clearly 
the result of political deals embodied in the various reform acts, no longer 
benefited from the legitimacy hallowed by time that the 40 shilling freehold 
and the diverse borough franchises had enjoyed prior to 1832.19 
                                                          
16 Thomas Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” Comparative Political 
Studies 43, no. 8-9 (2010): 1009. 
17 Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” 1009. 
18 Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” 1010. 
19 Ertman, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” 1010. 
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 Parry takes a more critical stance of the First Reform Act, arguing that it did not 
drastically alter the social composition of parliament, with Members of Parliament still 
coming mostly from the wealthy, industrial, and gentrified families of Britain.20 He went 
on to argue that the minor changes in parliamentary composition caused two important 
problems: the increased political activity of MPs threatened government control of the 
timetable for legislation, and the Radical MPs who had entered Parliament following the 
Reform Act pushed consistently for reforms that the government was not ready to grant.21 
Martin Pugh gives a similarly critical appraisal of the 1832 Reform Act, characterizing 
the changes brought by it as “remarkably slight.”22 Pugh claims that while the size of the 
electorate was doubled, to just over 700,000, that still only amounted to twenty percent of 
British adult men, and that the £10 householder qualification had effectively enfranchised 
the middle classes and largely excluded workingmen.23 Of the overall significance of the 
First Reform Act, Pugh stated: 
While reform gave the middle-class formal recognition it did not allow them 
extra power, at least in the short term. The social composition of the post-
1832 parliaments proved to be very similar to those of the earlier period. 
Most MPs continued to be drawn from landed and titles families in spite of 
the reduction in the number of small patronage boroughs. In short, 1832 
failed to bring about a bourgeois revolution. On the other hand, those Whigs 
who claimed who claimed that the Great Reform Act represented a final 
solution of the reform question were over-optimistic. Indeed, no further 
reform took place until 1867, but once the old system had been altered there 
could be no fundamental objection to further change.24 
 
                                                          
20 Parry, Liberal Government, 99. 
21 Parry, Liberal Government, 102-3. 
22 Martin Pugh, Britain Since 1789: Concise History (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1999), 49. 
23 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 49. 
24 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 50. 
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Thus, while the Great Reform Act did double the size of the electorate, this increase in 
size only encompassed between fifteen and twenty percent of British men, mostly of 
whom came from middle class families. Ultimately, the reform did not drastically alter 
the composition or operation of Parliament but did create national politics and set the 
stage for future parliamentary reforms. 
However, it was not until the 1860s that a new call for reform began to gain 
momentum in parliament. In the years between 1832 and 1867 democracy was a 
bogeyman, a threat to be held up as a sign of how things could go wrong.25 However, by 
the mid-1860s there was little disagreement in Parliament that reform was necessary and 
that it needed to include a significant working-class enfranchisement.26 This was the 
work of William Gladstone, who argued that parliamentary reform could be used to 
incorporate the working-class aristocracy into the existing political hierarchy to prevent 
the risk of socialism gaining a foothold in Britain.27 Gladstone introduced a bill in 1866 
which would have added only a few hundred thousand new voters; mostly shopkeepers 
and artisans who were known to be mostly pro-Liberal.28 There was intense criticism of 
that bill by both sides as a large part of the Liberal party wanted universal manhood 
suffrage and the Conservative party desired a more selective electorate.29 Disagreement 
over the terms of the bill ultimately led to John Russell and Gladstone’s resignation and a 
minority Conservative government in which Benjamin Disraeli proposed a bill more 
progressive than the initial bill proposed by Gladstone.30 Jon Lawrence calls this bill a 
                                                          
25 Hugh Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy: Britain 1832-1918 (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 102. 
26 Robert Saunders, Democracy and the Vote in British Politics 1848-1867: The Making of the Second 
Reform Act (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 265. 
27 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 138. 
28 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99. 
29 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 139. 
30 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99. 
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giant leap towards urban male democracy with the introduction of a male householder 
franchise to urban Britain, which saw the electorate grow to 1.7 million voters by the 
mid-1870s.31 
 This bill, which eventually became the Second Reform Act granted household 
suffrage to men in the boroughs of Britain; an extension which Disraeli and the 
Conservative party likely saw as the necessary price to pay for remaining in power.32 
Under the initial bill proposed by Gladstone, the Liberal party had only offered to extend 
the franchise to the middle class, whereas the Conservative bill proposed by Disraeli 
extended the franchise to the urban working class in an attempt to convert them to 
dependable Conservative voters.33 Whether or not this move had the intended outcome is 
questionable, as the Conservative party was out of power after a general election in 1868. 
Martin Pugh echoes this sentiment, arguing that the Second Reform Act did little to help 
Conservatives directly, with the general election of 1868 returning a larger majority for 
Liberals than they had usually enjoyed, and for a time led to many Conservatives 
condemning Disraeli for his folly in attempting to outflank the radicals.34  
However, the Second Reform Act did have significant impacts on the political 
landscape of Britain in the two decades between the Second and Third Reform Acts. 
With the expansion of the electorate among working class voters in Britain’s industrial 
centers, the two major political parties became national parties rather than regional 
ones.35 The Second Reform Act also had the effect of making alternating governments 
                                                          
31 Jon Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 43. 
32 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 140-1 
33 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 141. 
34 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99. 
35 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 143. 
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more frequent; a substantial change from the near generation of power that had been 
enjoyed by the Liberal party between 1846 and 1867.36 
Pugh takes a favorable view of the Second Reform Act, seeing three key impacts 
of the reform. The first of those effects was to stimulate the organization of radical 
pressure on parliamentarians in favor of further franchise reform.37 Pugh also sees 
significant changes in the electoral system; both Gladstone’s introduction of the secret 
ballot in in 1872 and a bill to place limits on election expenditure and penalties for 
corrupt practices in 1883 made politics more open and democratic.38 Finally, Pugh claims 
that the Second Reform Act led to the Third Reform Act in 1885, when the qualifications 
of the 1867 Act were extended to working men in the counties and increasing the 
electorate to five and a half million voters.39 
According to Lawrence, the Second Reform Act brought with it an increased 
sensitivity among the British people towards the persistence of disorder in public politics, 
with many observers noting an increase in electoral violence at the 1868 elections.40 
However, Lawrence is also sure not to simply take those observers at their word and see 
1867 as a watershed for the increase of electoral violence. Instead, Lawrence sees events 
after the Second Reform Act as a result of the changing nature of public opinion and how 
it was expressed. He argues that: 
What changed after 1867 was not so much the level of disorder, as the 
political and social context in which disorder was understood. In many 
boroughs non-voters were for the first time in a minority, at least among adult 
males, and traditional rituals that had symbolized their inclusion in the 
political system, such as public nomination at the hustings and the ritual 
                                                          
36 Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 144. 
37 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 99. 
38 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 100. 
39 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 100. 
40 Lawrence, Electing Our Masters, 44. 
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aspects of public voting, came to be seen as dangerous anachronisms which 
threatened to impede the smooth absorption of the new voters into orderly 
and rational electoral politics.41 
 
Thus, the electoral violence that is sometimes associated with the 1867 Reform Act is not 
necessarily a direct result of the act itself, but instead an increased sensitivity to the 
violence as more people were becoming enfranchised and the old traditions of public 
politics were falling by the wayside. 
 John Vincent, in his work studying the Second Reform Act and its effects on 
Lancashire, sees significant impacts of the Second Reform Act on British politics. His 
argument is that the major impact of the Second Reform Act was the changes in the 
distribution of seats in Lancashire.42 According to Vincent, this redistribution altered the 
number of members returned to Parliament for each party, and attributes that change 
more to the changes in each constituency rather than any change in the electorate itself.43 
He does however concede that the Second Reform Act brought about some significant 
indirect changes in the make up the electorate in Lanchashire in terms of rural versus 
urban elements. He claims that while the 1832 £10 freehold franchise worked against the 
rural laborers in Lancashire, the 1867 ratepayer franchise worked in their favor, 
especially at a time when the Cotton Famine had caused a reduction in the industrial 
population.44 Vincent argues that this increase in the electorate at a time that 
Conservatives were favored among rural laborers was part of the reason that rural 
                                                          
41 Lawrence, Electing Our Masters, 44-5. 
42 John Vincent, “The Effect of the Second Reform Act in Lancashire,” The Historical Journal 11, no. 1 
(1968): 86. 
43 Vincent, “The Effect of the Second Reform Act in Lancashire,” 86. 
44 Vincent, “The Effect of the Second Reform Act in Lancashire,” 87. 
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Lancashire saw in increase in the number of Conservatives returned to Parliament in the 
1868 general election.45 
 Some historians have taken a more measured view of the Second Reform Act. 
Parry examines the Second Reform Act through the lens of its four stated objectives: 
male household suffrage, limiting that suffrage through a series of restrictions based on 
taxation, a high occupation franchise, and the limited redistribution of seats.46 While it is 
clear to Parry that the Second Reform Act achieved those goals, it is because of those 
goals that he argues that the Act has had a very narrow scope of effectiveness. Like the 
Reform Act of 1832, the limited nature of seat redistribution on Parliament meant that in 
the following elections, there was not a significant change in its composition.47 Hugh 
Cunningham reaches essentially the same conclusion as Parry, although addresses the 
issue by considering the provisions of the Second Reform Act under two heads: the 
extension of the franchise and the redistribution of seats in Parliament.48 On the first 
account, Cunningham gives a critical assessment of the Second Reform Act, stating that 
before 1867 the franchise had been extended to roughly one in five men in England and 
Wales, but by 1869 that figure had only risen to around one in three.49 That meant that 
nearly two-thirds of the adult male population and the entirety of the female population 
was without a vote.50 The largest increase in the franchise of course came in the 
boroughs, and as such led to an uneven distribution of voting power, clustered in urban 
centers with agricultural laborers being left out of the political equation. For 
                                                          
45 Vincent, “The Effect of the Second Reform Act in Lancashire,” 87. 
46 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 213-4. 
47 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 216-7. 
48 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 103. 
49 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 104. 
50 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 104. 
13 
 
 
 
Cunningham, it was this uneven distribution of political power that was the largest failure 
of the measure to increase the size of the electorate under the Second Reform Act.51 
Cunningham also had significant criticism of the Second Reform Act’s limited attempts 
to redistribute seats in Parliament. Those provisions were driven by the Conservatives’ 
desires to consolidate their strength in the counties, and as such sought to increase the 
number of county seats to the detriment of urban constituencies.52 This led to urban 
constituencies of fewer than 10,000 voters losing one or both of their MPs, which 
released 52 seats, 25 of which were given to newly created seats in the counties.53 
Despite this effort at redistribution, several anomalies still remained, with Wiltshire and 
Dorset, a constituency of 450,000 retaining 25 MPs while London had only 24 MPs for a 
population of over three million.54 To sum up his thoughts on the Second Reform Act, 
Cunningham concludes by saying, “The practice of politics retained many elements of 
the world before 1867 – or before 1832.55 
 The third piece of the trio of major parliamentary reforms of the nineteenth 
century was the Third Reform Act of 1884-5. While often referred to as a singular entity, 
the Third Reform Act consists of two major pieces of legislation: The Representation of 
the People Act of 1884 and the Redistribution Act of 1885. These two acts were a 
response to the inequality in the electoral system remaining after the 1832 and 1867 
reforms.56 In the years following the Second Reform Act in 1867, the Liberal party 
maintained hegemonic control over Parliament, accelerating the pace of reforming 
                                                          
51 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 104. 
52 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 104. 
53 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 104. 
54 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 104. 
55 Cunningham, The Challenge of Democracy, 105. 
56 Sean Lang, Parliamentary Reform 1785-1928 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1993), 103. 
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legislation drastically under the leadership of William Ewart Gladstone.57 Most of these 
reforms were targeted at the working-class, particularly in the fields of education and 
local government reform designed at ending corruption.58 However, the most important 
of the Liberal policies from 1874 forward was their commitment to further electoral 
reform, the most significant of which was a commitment to household suffrage.59 In the 
late 1870s and early 1880s Gladstone drew the ire of Liberals in Parliament by 
abandoning the party platform in favor of reversing Disraeli’s imperial policies.60 Matters 
were worsened by the disruption of Irish Liberals in Parliament, who supported none of 
Gladstone’s measures save the 1881 Land Act, which led to the departure of some of the 
aristocratic Whigs from the Liberal party. Facing disappointment from all sectors of the 
Liberal party, Gladstone introduced the Third Reform Act, increasing the number of 
voters to around 5.7 million, which amounted to sixty percent of the male population 
being enfranchised by 1885.61 When taken together, the two acts comprising the Third 
Reform Act extended the urban enfranchisement of the Second Reform Act into the 
counties and essentially established the modern single seat constituencies in Parliament.62 
Thus, the Third Reform Act became the point at which Parliament opened its doors to the 
suburbs. Through the redistribution of seats in Parliament, the new seats were given 
largely to suburban areas, which were overwhelmingly middle-class areas and were 
mostly Conservative.63 The 1884 reform did not introduce a wider franchise; it only 
extended the provisions of the 1867 Act into the counties, without altering the basic 
                                                          
57 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 236. 
58 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 237. 
59 Parry, Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, 280. 
60 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 105. 
61 Pugh, Britain Since 1789, 106. 
62 Lang, Parliamentary Reform, 103. 
63 Lang, Parliamentary Reform, 106. 
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thinking on who should and should not have the vote.64 However, the Third Reform Act 
did change the nature of the political nation in the years following 1884-5. The most 
radical feature of the reform was the new redistribution of seats, which broke up the old 
country constituencies and with them the traditional bonds of patronage and deference.65 
The Third Reform Act also created new constituencies in heavily urban, working-class 
areas of major cities, making class the most important determining factor in major 
cities.66 By creating a framework for a class-based political system, the Third Reform Act 
was more of a step towards democracy than either its framers or its critics ever allowed 
for.67 
 It is this step toward democracy that sets the Third Reform Act apart from its 
predecessors in 1832 and 1867. Although not intentional in nature, by enfranchising the 
working-class in the counties and redistributing seats in Parliament, the Third Reform 
Act set Britain further along the path towards true democracy. Lawrence goes so far as to 
claim that the Third Reform Act was instrumental in initiating the emancipation of the 
agricultural laborer.68 He goes on to argue that: 
Within a decade elected county and parish councils existed alongside the 
new, more democratic Parliamentary divisions and the parties found 
themselves dragged inexorably into a competition for the farm laborer’s vote. 
Reform heralded an explosion of political meetings across the countryside. 
As late as 1884 one still finds local Conservative parties such as the Oswestry 
Association holding no political meetings at all outside elections for dear that 
they might stir their quiescent radical foes into action. But once ‘John Hodge’ 
had the vote such an approach was unthinkable, not least because agricultural 
laborers were thought to be all but immune to traditional means of political 
persuasion.69 
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For Lawrence, the enfranchisement of the agricultural laborer had significant importance 
for the nature of political discourse. Many in the party organizations assumed that the 
new rural voters were poorly educated and incapable of understanding political 
pamphlets or fancy campaign prose.70 As such, politicians were reminded to ‘keep things 
simple’ for their largely uneducated and indifferent voters, noting that voters were much 
more likely to be swayed by passionate campaign oratory than by policy and campaign 
platforms.71 Thus, one of the most significant impacts of the Third Reform Act was, 
according to Lawrence, an alteration in the relationship between MPs and their 
constituencies, as evidenced by language used on the campaign trail and in political 
meetings. 
 Mary Chadwick takes a similar stance on the impact of the Third Reform Act on 
the relationship between government and the people in the last years of he nineteenth 
century. However, rather than examining the change in political discourse, Chadwick 
instead chooses to examine the redistribution of seats. For her, the largest benefit of the 
Third Reform Act was the creation of new seats in heavily urban areas, with the ratio 
between the largest and smallest electorates being 1:8 rather than 1:250 as it had been in 
the years before 1885.72 For Chadwick, the importance of this redistribution was that for 
the first time, the metropolis finally received adequate representation in Parliament.73 
Once this redistribution was completed, the increased representation of the urban 
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working-class through the creation of single member districts created a system in which 
the two major parties had to make a more concerted effort to appeal to potential voters. 
 Sean Lang takes a more critical view of the Third Reform Act, arguing that it did 
not do enough to usher in true democracy. He claims that despite the franchise extension 
of 1884, forty percent of the male working-class were still without the vote, as were all 
women.74 He continues by arguing that even though the vote was expanded into the 
counties the old ties of patronage still existed in the counties, and that with no campaign 
to free agricultural laborers from the system of deference, the old ways in the counties 
was slow to die.75 Lang also has criticism for the Redistribution Act, claiming that the 
creation of new seats in the counties forced suburban votes to be either included in the 
county seats, in which their mostly Conservative votes did not matter, or in urban districts 
where their votes were not enough to have an impact on the ultimate outcome of any 
election.76 He argues that the Third Reform Act did not introduce democracy because the 
government did not believe in it. Instead, Lang suggests that popular politics remained an 
essentially intellectual affair and that the extension of the 1867 franchise did not indicate 
an change in the basic thinking of who should and should not be allowed to vote.77 
 This thesis is split into five chapters, with each discussing a specific aspect of 
British politics at the time of the Third Reform Act. Chapter 2 covers the Conservative 
ascendancy of the last two decades of the Victorian period and how the changes brought 
by the Third Reform Act enabled this ascendancy. Chapter 3 looks at the Liberal party 
disintegration during the same period and how the Liberal party’s inability to appeal to 
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popular opinion caused their fall from power. Chapter 4 explores the effects of the Third 
Reform Act on the Irish Home Rule crisis. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the effects of the 
Third Reform Act on the importance of pressure groups. Chapter 5 focuses on 
sociopolitical pressure groups and how reformers outside of government exerted pressure 
on Parliament to implement changes to British society and politics. Chapter 6 focuses on 
economic pressure groups and how MPs were influenced by public opinion in their 
implementation of economic reforms. When taken together these chapters will provide a 
more complete picture of how the Third Reform Act created a political system which was 
more democratic than that which had existed before the Act became law. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY DURING THE CONSERVATIVE  
 
ASCENDANCY 
 
 
The twenty years following the passage of the Third Reform Act, from 1886-
1906, saw a Conservative ascendancy, during which, the Conservative Party reversed 
almost forty years of political minority and served as the majority ruling party for nearly 
the entire twenty-year period, with only a three-year period of Liberal government under 
Gladstone and then Lord Rosebery from 1892 until 1895.78 This period has been the 
subject of intensive study from historians, with differing opinions on the causes and 
importance of the Conservative return to power. Martin Pugh argues that the 
Conservative return to power was caused by a sea change in British politics. Pugh states 
that during this time the middle classes and Whig aristocrats were anxious to join the 
Conservative party in a defense of property and other British institutions from the threat 
of radicalism, socialism, and Irish nationalism. Many of the radical grievances at this 
point had been satisfied, and those Nonconformists now within the political system were 
more inclined to vote for the Conservative party, especially in the face of external threats 
in the form of colonial rivalry and the Anglo-German naval race which together created a 
more nationalistic mood with helped the Conservative party by pushing domestic issues 
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off the agenda.79 Jonathan Parry takes a different view; arguing that the rise of 
Conservative party power was caused solely by the disintegration of the Liberal party 
resulting from the Irish Home Rule crisis. Parry claims that the sectionalism and 
radicalism of the Liberal party allowed the Conservative party to coalesce around a 
nationalistic platform of maintaining the Empire in full.80 Parry’s argument that the 
Conservative rise to power was solely caused by Liberal disintegration may be due to his 
focus on the fortunes of Liberal government, but is nonetheless too narrow an 
interpretation. A more accurate and thorough explanation for the rise of the Conservative 
party from 1886-1906 comes from Jon Lawrence who provides a multifaceted 
explanation across two works. Lawrence argues that the Conservative party’s ascendancy 
was caused in part by the active efforts of the party to persuade the urban working and 
middle classes to vote for their candidates, and because of the disintegration of the 
Liberal party in the midst of the Irish Home Rule crisis.81  
The passage of the Third Reform Act created a political system in which direct 
appeal to the newly enfranchised working classes was a necessity. While it is true that the 
working classes in the cities had been given the franchise in 1867, the redistribution of 
seats under the Third Reform Act created single member districts in industrial cities, 
which meant that both Liberal and Conservative candidates had to appeal more 
effectively and directly to the currents of public opinion to persuade their constituencies 
rather than relying on traditional voting patterns, as seen by the sharp decline in 
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uncontested returns in the 1885 election which was the first held since passage of the 
Third Reform Act.82 This reliance on currents of public opinion for electoral success was 
beneficial for the Conservative party as they had a broader coalition than did the Liberal 
party, and sought to maintain the status quo, whereas the Liberals were more focused on 
unpopular social reform campaigns advocated for by a minority of potential voters. This 
change is seen in Leeds, which was a three-member constituency in the years 1868-1885, 
then split into five single member districts following the Third Reform Act.83 This change 
resulted in political power being more closely correlated with population in districts 
across Britain, with the difference in population from the largest to smallest district being 
8-1 after the Third Reform Act, whereas it had been 250-1 before the Act’s passage.84 
This redistribution, combined with the  middle-class flight to the suburbs had caused the 
towns and cities of Britain to become increasingly cohesive working-class 
communities.85 
 Ultimately, it was the Conservative party that was best prepared for this new 
challenge, and thus it was the Conservative party that gained enough support of the 
middle and working classes to return to power. The Conservative party employed two 
strategies to achieve this political advantage over their Liberal party counterparts. The 
first was an appeal to middle-class industrialists in urban areas, the so-called “Villa 
Tories.” By reasserting their role as the defenders of property, the Conservatives were 
able to maintain the support of the middle-class that they had enjoyed throughout the 
                                                          
82 Luke Blaxill, “Electioneering, the Third Reform Act, and Political Change in the 1880s,” Parliamentary 
History 30, no 3. (2011): 346. 
83 Matthew Roberts, "'Villa Toryism' and Popular Conservatism in Leeds, 1885-1902," The Historical 
Journal 49, no. 1 (2006): 220-1. 
84 Chadwick, “The Role of Redistribution,” 683. 
85 Lawrence, Speaking for the People, 29. 
22 
 
 
 
nineteenth century. The second strategy employed was one aimed towards gaining the 
support of the newly enfranchised working classes in the wake of the Third Reform Act. 
To achieve this, the Conservatives sought to associate themselves with aspects of 
Victorian working-class culture. By sponsoring social clubs, associating with football 
teams, and defending the drink, the Conservatives presented themselves as more in touch 
with working-class values than the Liberal party which, in an attempt to gain more 
middle-class support overlooked working-class values because of the obsession with 
moral reform agenda of faddists.86  
 The dramatic rise of the Conservative party in 1886 was mirrored by the split and 
collapse of the Liberal party. The Liberal party split, caused by differences over the Irish 
Home Rule question occurred at the same time the Conservative ascendancy began, and 
was a major cause of the Conservative rise to power. The Liberal party split was not the 
sole cause for the rise of the Conservative party in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth 
century, but it was a major factor, as disaffected Liberals caucused with the Tories 
following the Irish Home Rule Crisis. The ineptitude of the Liberal party in appealing to 
its voters cannot be seen as the sole cause for the rise of the Conservative party either. To 
suggest either of those causes as the primary culprit would be to imply that the rise of 
Conservative party power was merely a passive benefit from the collapse of Liberal 
government. Instead, the Conservative ascendancy was caused by an active effort of the 
part of the Conservative party to expand their political organization and appeal to a newly 
expanded electorate and aided passively by internal strife within the Liberal party. By 
appealing to broad sections of the British polity, the Conservative party was able to 
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solidify their support among the middle-class by presenting themselves as the defenders 
of propertied interests and the Empire, especially during the Irish Home Rule Crisis, 
while gaining significant enough support from the working-class by appealing to 
working-class culture and defending “English” values to gain a victory over the Liberal 
party. 
 The Conservative ascendancy in the late Victorian period is a subject that has 
received much attention from historians in the latter half of the twentieth century. The 
discussion of the Conservative rise to power has fallen into two schools. On the one hand, 
the Conservative rise to power is a product of the active efforts of the Conservative party 
to solidify support among their upper and middle-class and attempts to appeal to the 
newly enfranchised working-class voters after the Third Reform Act in 1885.87 On the 
other, the Conservative party merely benefits from Liberal ineptitude in the late-Victorian 
period, only coming to power because of the split in the Liberal party caused by the 
controversial adoption of Irish Home Rule as a central tenet of the Liberal party platform. 
To best understand this debate, it is useful to examine the interpretation of the 
Conservative party’s efforts, the Liberal party’s ineptitude, and the Liberal split in 1885-
6.88 
 Villa Toryism is the brand of Toryism that appealed to the middle-class. Matthew 
Roberts contributes to the argument that the Conservative ascendancy was a result of 
their own efforts. He explains that Conservatives were able to appeal to the newly 
enfranchised masses by rejecting the cold Liberal doctrines of utilitarianism and moral 
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improvement, and instead focused on the old Tory-radical tradition.89 In his study of 
Villa Toryism in Leeds, Roberts explains that the driving force behind efforts to diminish 
middle-class support for the Liberal Party was Leeds Church Extension Society, which 
sought to build more churches.90 This is indicative of the Conservative efforts to present 
themselves as the defenders of the Established Church of England, which resonated with 
the middle-class. The importance of the Established Church to Conservative support is 
important not just religious grounds, however. The party’s support of the Establish 
Church also appealed to their jingoistic defense of Empire, as the Established Church 
stood for Empire and Protestantism, in contrast to the devolution and Catholicism 
associated with Irish Home Rule. 
 Roberts also shows Conservative efforts to gain support among the working-
classes and is quick to counter historians who claim that working-class Conservatism is 
merely political deviancy.91 He shows that the Conservative actively campaigned to gain 
working-class support by presenting themselves as a non-ideological and pragmatic 
party.92 This effort to appeal to the working-class is echoed by Jon Lawrence, who shows 
how the Conservative party deliberately associated themselves with aspects of urban 
society such as public houses, football, and racing to distinguish themselves from the 
moral reforming Liberals.93 
 The necessity of more effectively organizing the urban working-classes for 
Conservative politics is seen in a meeting of the Conservative Party, as reported in the 
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Leeds Mercury on 23 May 1887. Party leaders claimed that the Conservatives had long 
been guilty of understating the value of a careful and exact organization.94 In this meeting 
Conservative leaders called on the party to effectively organize to counter the extant 
National Liberal Federation (NLF) and National League, which had been promoting 
Liberal ideas. They believed that Conservative power in government, which had been 
lacking since the 1840s had never equaled the real extent and predominance of 
Conservative ideals amongst the people of Britain. It was suggested that Liberal success 
could be attributed to their alliance with the Nonconformists because while the 
Established Church and Wesleyans (traditional Conservative allies) had no interest in 
becoming involved in politics, the Nonconformists did not share that same conviction. 
The presiding speaker of the meeting closed with a call to action for the Party to appeal to 
labor organizations and the church, without which the Radicals would be left powerless. 
The speaker claimed that organizing for the party will be “no work which the 
Conservative Club will find more useful to the party and the country than in stimulating 
organisations of this kind, and carrying them out to the fullest limits and to the most 
remote corners of the country.”95 
 However, not all historians agree that the Conservative party regained power 
because of their own efforts to appeal to voters. Hugh Stephens argues instead that the 
Third Reform Act played a significant role in creating the Conservative ascendancy. 
According to Stephens, by the 1880s the distinction between county and borough was 
essentially non-existent, and that the Reform Act narrowed the gap between the two 
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parties ideologically, making it easier for the Liberal Unionists to jump ship.96 Thus, the 
changing electoral circumstances were the driving factor behind the Conservative 
ascendancy, rather than any efforts on the part of Conservatives to improve their 
fortunes.97 This interpretation is supported by reports around the 1886 general election, 
which pointed to the Liberal government being defeated because of an alliance between 
the Liberal Unionists and the Conservative party.98 This alliance is seen in the speech 
delivered by Peter Macliver during the 1886 general election. Macliver claims that his 
opponent in that election had initially come forward as a Liberal but had since been 
adopted into the Liberal Unionist fold. Macliver goes on to claim that his opponent was 
going to be welcomed into the Conservative party the very night of his speech.99 
However, this Stephens’s interpretation of the Conservative ascendancy makes too much 
of the ideological similarities between the Liberal Unionists and the Conservative party. 
While these two parties agreed on their opposition to Home Rule, that should not be 
taken as an indication that they collaborated on a broad spectrum of policy. In the years 
following the defeat of Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule measure, the Liberal Unionists were 
putting forward the same radical policies they had advocated for when they were 
competing against the Conservatives as part of the Liberal party.100  This shows that 
although the alliance between the Conservative party and the Liberal Unionists party was 
effective in defeating the Irish Home Rule measure, the claim that ideological similarities 
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between the two parties made it easier for Liberal Unionists to jump ship to the 
Conservative party lacks nuance.  
The Third Reform Act meant that previously large electoral constituencies were 
broken up into smaller, single member districts, as seen in Leeds where the three member 
constituency was split into five new districts.101 The ultimate effect here is the 
democratization of politics, and the beginning of what Joseph Chamberlain referred to as 
‘government of the people, by the people.’102 It is from this point that issues of the 
condition of the poor, the legitimacy of wealth and property, and Irish Home Rule were 
to feature prominently as permanent fixtures of the political agenda.103 
 Rather than examining the Conservative party’s efforts to garner support among 
the middle and working-class voters, some historians instead choose to view the 
Conservative ascendancy through a framework centered around Liberal ineptitude. 
Although not giving it primacy in his argument, Jon Lawrence takes this view in his work 
on Urban Toryism, arguing that popular Toryism emerged as a critique of Liberal 
machine politics.104 Other historians have also claimed that Liberal ineptitude in 
appealing to their constituencies created a situation in which the Conservatives could 
return to power. Hammond argues that the Liberal party split was caused by a clash of 
social class. His argument has lost some credibility over time, but should nevertheless be 
considered for its assessment that Home Rule was the turning point in British history.105 
Biagini claims that the Liberal party’s failure to adequately mobilize their political 
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organization led to the rank-and-file party members challenging party leadership over the 
future of party policy.106 Fraser argues along this line, stating that Liberal policy 
regarding property and reform created the wave of opinion needed for the Liberal 
Unionists to carry their support to the Conservative party.107 Lawrence continues that the 
Liberal commitment to moral reform damaged their ability to appeal to the working-
class.108 
 Finally, it is important to examine the way that the Liberal party split has been 
interpreted by historians over time. Initially, the social conflict theory gained much 
traction among historians.109 This can be seen in the writing of Annie Porritt, writing 
shortly before the First World War, in which she explains that the Home Rule vote split 
the Liberal Party, causing the dissolution of Parliament and the creation of a Conservative 
government with a 118 member majority.110 Lubenow asserts that many of Gladstone’s 
contemporaries agreed with this social conflict theory, seeing it the reason for the Liberal 
Unionist defection.111 
 However, Lubenow himself rejects the social conflict theory, instead favoring the 
idea that the Liberal party split because of political rather than social reasons. He shows 
that despite the Liberal Unionist defection Gladstone still held the majority of all classes, 
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and that the party split over issues that did not fit properly into the Liberal agenda.112 
Stephens agrees with Lubenow, arguing that by the time of the 1886 election the two 
parties had become similar, and that this made it easier for the Liberal Unionists to 
defect.113 This is echoed by Fraser, who argued that by 1892 Chamberlain had moved 
closer to the Conservatives than some of his Liberal Unionist allies including 
Hartington.114 Fraser argues that the line between Conservative and Liberal had blurred in 
the aftermath of the Third Reform Act, and that while Irish Home Rule may have played 
a role in the initial split of the Liberal party it did not factor significantly in the permanent 
separation of the Liberal Unionists.115 Fraser’s argument should be discounted however, 
as the split between Liberals and Liberal Unionists was a permanent one, and the central 
point of contention in that split was the Irish Home Rule issue, which remained 
unresolved until after the First World War.116 
The traditional bastion of Conservative party support during the nineteenth 
century was the landed class. However, during the latter portions of the nineteenth 
century, there was also a significant defection of middle-class voters to the Conservative 
party, a fact that is given little attention or significance by those who promote the 
‘electoral sociological’ explanation of the rise of the Conservative party.117 This 
movement of middle-class voters to the Conservative party, “Villa Tories” as they came 
to be known, were a broad-based coalition of voters and represented a self-reliant, 
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hierarchical version of Conservatism.118 The Conservative party was able to entice this 
contingent of voters in the late nineteenth century through a concerted campaign designed 
to take votes away from the Liberal party. By presenting themselves as the defenders of 
propertied, especially the urban property interests, the Conservative party was able to 
persuade factory owners who were concerned over Liberal party factory reforms. The 
Conservative party also gained the support of the middle-class through their support of 
the Empire, as maintaining the status quo was seen as a benefit for industrialists who 
relied on imperial markets. By appealing to the economic interests of the middle-class the 
Conservative party was able to break the Liberal party dominance over the borough seats. 
In the new system of electoral politics brought about by the Third Reform Act, this was 
an indictment of Liberal party machine politics, which many middle-class and working-
class voters felt was putting the interests of the party over the interests of the nation. 
 As can be seen in the case of Leeds, the Conservative party mounted an 
aggressive campaign to stamp out middle-class liberalism, both to rally and reassure their 
supporters to and expand their traditional voting base beyond Anglican supporters.119 
According to Matthew Roberts: 
The active pursuit of what was increasingly termed 'moderate Liberal support' 
by the Leeds Conservative party, which presented itself as the defender of 
property against the threat of a radicalized Liberal party, dated from the early 
1870s. This led the Conservative party to exaggerate both the power of the 
radicals within the Liberal party, nationally and locally, and the disruptive 
and destructive effects of the radical programme.120 
 
Thus, the Conservative party was making an active effort to court middle-class voters 
away from the Liberal party. As suggested by Roberts, this effort was necessary for the 
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Conservative party to be electorally relevant, because contrary to previous interpretations, 
Villadom was not always the electoral heartland of the late-Victorian Conservative 
party.121 Instead, the enfranchisement and redistribution of seats created by the Third 
Reform Act created pockets of Conservative party support in the suburbs and industrial 
areas; areas in which the Conservative party had to work hard to maintain support.122 
With this shift in the electoral landscape, the Conservative Party looked for a new way to 
appeal to voters and gain support in those pockets. 
 To maintain that support, the Conservative party attacked the Liberal party as 
being concerned with socialist land reform legislation and claimed that the Liberal party 
could not be trusted with property rights and landed interests.123 The Conservative leader 
Salisbury argued that all propertied classes had a reason to be afraid of the Liberal party’s 
land reform policy, specifically naming the Irish Land Bill as socialist.124  
The Third Reform Act caused a shift in the electoral landscape, which also led to 
a shift in Conservative party strategy. Unlike the Conservative party of previous years, 
the late-Victorian Conservative party became increasingly interested in the urban 
propertied elites, spurred by the redistribution of seats skewing electoral political in favor 
of the boroughs.125 Through this campaign, the Conservative party was able to solidify 
their hold over the ‘white-collar’ professionals living in the suburbs.126 To gain the 
support of the urban elites, the Conservative party employed a strategy of using local 
notables to stand for office and boost Conservative party commitment to civic 
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engagement in the community. This caused the urban elites to attach their identity and 
significance to the Conservative party and overcame their hesitance to support unknowns 
standing for office.127 
Part of this middle-class support for the Conservative party, especially in the cities 
also came from a dissatisfaction with Liberal party machine politics. As Lawrence states: 
Central to this reaction was popular suspicion of machine politics as 
epitomized by Joseph Chamberlain's Birmingham Liberal Association -- the 
so-called Birmingham caucus. In the larger cities, where the caucus was 
generally most conspicuous, Conservative politicians seized on latent 
antagonism towards party as an essential element in the construction of an 
alternative, non-Radical political discourse. This discourse shared 
Radicalism's traditional concern with political exclusion, but the emphasis 
was now shifted from the exclusiveness of a restrictive franchise, to the 
exclusiveness of organized politics. The new Tory politics were not, 
therefore, simply a dry critique of organizational procedures within the 
Liberal party. Rather, the Tory case against the caucus encapsulated a much 
broader critique of the changing nature of late Victorian Liberalism.128 
 
Many of the leaders of the urban Conservative party were wealthy merchants and 
manufacturers who had become disenchanted with the machine politics of the Liberal 
party and the changing nature of Victorian liberalism. According to them, the Liberal 
party had been hijacked by fanatical Nonconformists and faddists, an attack designed to 
paint the Liberal party as a close-minded and static sect that had lost its purpose and 
direction.129 According to the Conservative party, the Liberal party’s obsession with 
faddism had caused them to give up their libertarian philosophy on individual liberty, 
instead focusing on a ‘coercive’ model of state-sponsored reform without regard for 
social customs.130 The final critique of Liberal party machine politics was the that this 
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preoccupation with moral reform caused the Liberal party to put their own interests above 
those of the nation.131 The Conservative party offered instead a ‘One Nation’ program 
based around patriotic and anti-faddist rhetoric to construct politics of the non-
political.132 This policy allowed the Conservative party to gain the support of the urban 
middle-class by appealing to their patriotism and pragmatism. 
 Thus, the Conservative ascendancy of 1886-1906 saw the Conservative party 
replace the Liberal party as the governing power in Britain after a forty-year period of 
Liberal party domination. This was done by a concerted effort on the part of Conservative 
party organization to appeal to new constituencies while maintaining their support from 
the traditional power bases. The middle-class remained a stronghold of Conservative 
party power because of Conservative party efforts to present themselves as the defenders 
of property. This helped bring urban industrialists into the conservative fold, as they 
viewed the Conservative party as being most likely to protect their interests. The 
working-class was incorporated into the Conservative party following the implementation 
of the Third Reform Act because of an active Conservative party effort to appeal to the 
new voters. This was accomplished through associating the Conservative party with 
aspects of urban working-class culture such as leisure and the drink. This is seen through 
the establishment of Conservative party social clubs. The Leamington Spa Courier and 
Warwickshire Standard reported that in the years immediately following the Third 
Reform Act, Conservative organization had been extended extensively towards the 
middle and working-classes.133 The Conservative party also defended the status quo of 
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the Anglican Church, as the working-class was wooed by stability. The stability was also 
emphasized by appealing to the self-interest of the working-class. By presenting itself as 
the defender of the British Empire, the Conservative party was able to portray an image 
of a party concerned with protecting British industrial interests, which in turn meant that 
industrial workers would be able to enjoy regular employment and competitive wages.  
However, it is not adequate or appropriate to only consider one cause of the 
Conservative ascendancy and the associated decline and split of the Liberal party. As 
demonstrated above, it is clear that the Conservative party played a major role in their 
own rise to power, but that does not discount the role that the Liberal party played in their 
own downfall. Lawrence, Hammond, and Biagini all give credence to the theory that the 
Liberal party was responsible for its own misfortunes in the years following the Third 
Reform Act.134 The tensions within the Liberal party can be seen in 1885, as the London 
Correspondent for the Ipswich Journal argued that Chamberlain and his colleagues in 
government had good reason to be upset with the state of their party. According to this 
correspondent Jesse Collins had already caused a minor split in the Liberal party over 
agricultural reforms, and his propaganda campaign had cost the Liberal party a 
significant portion of its support from agricultural laborers.135 Chamberlain is more 
pointed in his explanation of the split in the Liberal party and its subsequent failure to 
accomplish any of its goals. He places the blame squarely on the shoulders of Gladstone 
for being unable to compromise or move on from Irish Home Rule. The Edinburgh 
Evening News quotes Chamberlain’s article about Disestablishment in Wales in the 
Baptist stating:  
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Unfortunately at the very moment when the prospects of redress seem 
to be the most favourable, its has been overshadowed and darkened by the 
sudden introduction of a new subject of political contention, whose 
settlement may be long delayed. It may take ten or twenty years, or may even 
never be accomplished; but whether to process occupies a generation or a 
century “poor little Wales” must wait until Mr. Parnell is satisfied, and Mr. 
Gladstone’s policy adopted. They will not wait alone…Thirty-two millions of 
people must go without much-needed legislation because three million are 
disloyal, while nearly 600 members of the Imperial Parliament will be 
reduced to forced inactivity because some 80 delegates, representing the 
policy and receiving the pay of the Chicago Convention, are determined to 
obstruct all business until their demands have been conceded.136 
 
Chamberlain continues, claiming that as long as the Liberal party remains dedicated to 
Irish Home Rule, it will remain a shattered and impotent party.137 The Liberal party’s 
decline and eventual schism can also be partially explained by the hesitation of some 
members to change their way of thinking about political organization following the Third 
Reform Act. While political organizations were not new with the Third Reform Act, as 
the NLF had been founded in 1877, they Liberal party did not make as effective use of 
their political organizations as did their Conservative opponents in the two decades of 
Conservative ascendancy. William Clarke decried the new system of political 
organization, claiming it to be “machine politics” in the American style, and that this new 
organization would remove individual agency from politics altogether. Clarke argued that 
machine politics amounted to nothing more than wire-pulling and that although the 
political parties would remain, there would be no more valuable work for them to do.138 
Some were even more harsh in their criticism of the new political system than Clarke 
was. A correspondent from The Nottingham Evening Post stated that for an MP to freely 
speak his mind about the policy of his party leader was seen as the “highest of high 
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treason” in the eyes of the party machine.139 This mistrust of political organization in the 
Liberal party can still be seen into the 1890s, as evidenced by Grant Lawson’s rejection 
of a Justice of the Peace Bill on the grounds that it would “tend to foster political wire-
pulling with regard to the magisterial bench.”140 This shows that the Liberal party was 
responsible for its own struggles because they were unable to effectively organize in the 
same way as the Conservative party. 
Thus, the Conservative ascendancy of 1886-1906 was not merely a passive 
benefit of the disintegration of the Liberal party due to its own ineptitude. Instead, a more 
nuanced view of the Conservative ascendancy is required. One the one hand, the 
Conservative party did make a concerted effort to increase their organizational abilities in 
the years following the Third Reform Act. This increased ability to organize allowed to 
Conservative party to more accurately gauge public opinion and appeal to the newly 
enfranchised agricultural laborers. On the other hand, the Liberal party was largely 
responsible for their own decline and collapse in the years around the Third Reform Act. 
The party was unable to organize effectively due to trepidation over “machine politics” as 
explained above. This inability to organize left the party unable to draw significant 
support, especially in the years after 1886, when commitment to Irish Home Rule cause a 
split between Liberal and Liberal Unionists and made the Liberal party deeply unpopular 
for the next twenty years.  
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CHAPTER III  
 
 
THE LATE VICTORIAN LIBERAL PARTY COLLAPSE 
 
 
While the Conservative ascendancy was aided by the active efforts of the 
Conservative party to appeal to new sections of the electorate, the failings of the Liberal 
party during the same period must not be overlooked. It was from these failings that the 
Conservative party was able to draw much of its ammunition in the fight for electoral 
victory against the Liberal party. The Liberal party during this time decided on a policy 
course that became highly unpopular with voters and led to their decline in electoral 
relevance, and perhaps more importantly. Their schism from the Liberal Unionists. The 
first issue that plagued the Liberal party was their commitment to radical social reform. 
During this period the Liberal party, spurred by their Nonconformist supporters and MPs, 
attempted to introduce social reforms that proved to be deeply unpopular with their 
supporters. The Liberal party during this same time was losing support over what some 
claimed was their dependence on “faddists” to be politically relevant. Rohan McWilliam 
argues that these faddists (single-issue pressure groups) had become essential to the 
Liberal party by the late Victorian period and that Gladstone depended on their support to 
maintain his position as the leader of the government.141 The Liberal party also suffered 
from organizational problems during this period which led to their decline. The NLF was 
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the largest Liberal organization at the time, but many were hesitant to join the 
organization over fears that it would result in machine politics in the American style.142 
Furthermore, there was some uncertainty about Gladstone as a leader. Many had expected 
him to retire from politics and his return as Liberal party leader put a strain on the party. 
Gladstone’s leadership and his decision to tie the Liberal party to unpopular measures 
like Irish Home Rule was the reason for the loss of Liberal power, and the eventual 
schism with the Liberal Unionists.143 Finally, the most pressing issue of the period, Irish 
Home Rule, is also the issue that was responsible for the most tension within the Liberal 
party. When Gladstone supported Irish Home Rule publicly in 1885, and tried to push the 
issue through Parliament, he lost one third of the Liberal party in government, and the 
unpopularity of the measure made the Liberal party politically irrelevant for most of the 
next twenty years.144 One of the reasons this measure was particularly unpopular was the 
increasingly prominent nationalistic mood of the time, in which pride in the Empire was 
growing and its maintenance became a major political tool. For some, the Gladstonian 
support for the Irish Home Rule measure amounted to the first blow in the breakup of the 
Empire.145 As such, the Liberal party was derided for its desire to see the Empire 
dismantled, which allowed the Liberal Unionists and the Conservatives to improve their 
electoral standings by coming out in support of the Empire.146  When taken together, 
these factors provide a picture of the Liberal party decline and ultimate dissolution in the 
late nineteenth century. The years following the Third Reform Act were the first in a new 
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era in which public opinion was much more important than had previously been the case. 
The Liberal party failed to effectively organize their base to convince new voters to 
support their party and the policies adopted by the Liberals during this period were also 
unpopular with the British electorate. The result of these failures was the decline of the 
Liberal party, the schism with the Liberal Unionists over the Irish Home Rule issue, and 
the political irrelevance of the Liberal party from 1886-1906. The Conservative party 
took power during this time, and although they did much to position themselves to gain 
sufficient support to take power from the Liberal party in the general election, they were 
aided in this goal by the poor fortunes of the Liberal party. These poor fortunes, which 
cost the Liberal party its nearly forty years of hegemony, were largely the result of the 
Liberal party’s own designs.  
During the late Victorian period, the Liberal party became obsessed with a social 
reform program that was deemed a moral crusade by some. This policy of social reform 
was heavily influenced by the Nonconformist sectors of the Liberal party base, and these 
supporters, often referred to derisively as faddists, advocated for reforms centered around 
one main issue their group wished to change, with that issue often being temperance.147 
This commitment to faddists, and the tensions it caused can even be seen in the period 
immediately preceding the Third Reform Act. A correspondent with the Northern Echo 
wrote about those tensions, making the argument that the Liberal party was in the wrong 
for supporting faddist measures instead of putting the full force of their legislative power 
behind the 1884 Reform Bill.148 In the years preceding the Third Reform Act, 
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Gladstone’s support of unpopular moral reform campaign did not come with a significant 
cost for the Liberal party, as they maintained political hegemony for four decades until 
1886. In the years following the Third Reform Act however, this support would be costly, 
as the Liberal party lost seats in 1885 to the Conservative party, and then were swept 
from power in 1886 because of the unpopular Irish Home Rule issue. 
 Conservative party leaders were also vocal about their distaste for the Liberal 
party’s obsession with faddists, and thought it against the best interests of the nation. 
Charles Dalrymple MP railed against the faddists in 1885, arguing their insistence on 
Disestablishment was the wrong course for Scotland because the Church belonged to the 
people, and was a Church of the people, especially poor people. Dalrymple continued by 
claiming that the people were heavily invested in the Church and would defend it 
attacked by the government. Dalrymple closed his speech by stating that the faddists were 
not likely to see favorable action on their desire for Disestablishment, but that they were 
nevertheless insistent on “sinking every other question” until their grievances had been 
redressed.149 This alliance with faddists was a primary cause for the Liberal party’s loss 
of support within the working-classes. This is evident in the campaign for education 
reform and disestablishment of the Church of England. In Chamberlain’s radical 
programme of 1885-6 the Liberation Society plan for total disendowment of the Church 
of England was included for the first time.150 This was a natural progression of radical 
Liberal party thought, as the previous decades had seen a consistent growth of anti-
                                                          
149 “Mr. Dalrymple, MP, on “faddism,”” Edinburgh Evening News, 15 January 1885. 
150 Michael Barker, Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction of Liberal Policy in Britain, 1885-1894 
(New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1975), 31. 
41 
 
 
 
Church sentiment amongst radicals in the Liberal party.151 This was most obvious in the 
debate over public education. Nonconformists and radicals within the Liberal party were 
opposed to free education if voluntary schools were shut down due to lack of funds.152 In 
England and Wales at the time, Nonconformists were compelled to send their children to 
schools under Church of England management. This fact produced a powerful argument 
among many Nonconformists to bring voluntary schools under the control of elected 
schools boards.153 The collectivist approach to social policy can again be seen in the NLF 
proclamation that no settlements of the issue would be considered satisfactory unless all 
schools receiving public money were subject to public control through elected School 
Boards.154 However, this movement towards disendowment and disestablishment was a 
major blunder on the part of the Liberal party. The ploy alienated moderate liberals and 
did not win any support for the radical wing of the Liberal party.155 What the radical calls 
for disestablishment did do however was widen the growing split between Chamberlain 
and Gladstone, which became permanent over the issue of Irish Home Rule.156 
Chamberlain saw this split as being entirely caused by Gladstone’s support for Irish 
Home Rule and believed that the rift between the two factions would not be mended until 
the Home Rule issue was settled.157 
In the late nineteenth century, the Liberal party abandoned their traditional 
libertarian view on social reform for a state-interventionist approach, spurred by the 
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moral populism of the radical Nonconformists.158 Of these moral reform movements 
perhaps none was as widespread and influential as the temperance movement. Henry 
Cust spoke on these reform movements, and temperance in particular at a meeting of the 
Bourne and District Workingman’s Club, claiming that the attempts to enact temperance 
reform had ushered in unprecedented partisanship which had ruined politics and turned 
the politicians jealous and bitter. Cust went on the say that these reform groups were 
obsessed with their own sphere of influence and cared little for other concerns. Cust felt 
that this hindered the chances of progress and argued that such attempts at reform were 
criminal.159 This negative view of temperance reformers and their impact on the political 
process is further evidenced in the debate over the local option. It was not until 1895 that 
Liberal Unionists were able to bring a local option bill before Parliament with a realistic 
chance of it passing, due to the Liberal party’s tactics of blocking any such measure to 
appease the temperance faddists in their support base. According to a writer for The 
Belfast News-Letter, had it not been for these tactics, the local option question could have 
been handled many years earlier, and in a practical matter.160  
However, not all people in Britain viewed the moral social reforms in a negative 
light. Social reformers, encouraged by the evangelical revivalism sweeping through 
Britain in the latter part of the nineteenth century viewed self-improvement as the main 
business of life and sought to shape their Christian beliefs into reform movements.161 
This is evidenced by the foundation and growth of the United Kingdom Alliance, a 
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radical temperance movement supported by radical Nonconformists in the Liberal party 
and dedicated to temperance based on the local option.162 A leader of the United 
Kingdom Alliance, Dr. Frederic Richard Lees, argued that the drink was a public 
problem, and as such needed a public solution.163 This was a contradiction of Liberal 
party policy during the first half of the nineteenth century, which saw government take an 
active role in economic affairs, as evidenced by the repeal of the Corn Laws, but 
generally maintain a laissez-faire stance in the social sphere.164 The cause for this change 
was the evolution of philosophical thought on the human condition, which saw poverty 
and vice as symptoms of environment rather than inherent character flaws which must be 
overcome. As such, alcoholism was not always the fault of the individual and could be 
overcome by government action.165 This collectivist approach to social reform did allow 
for progress in civil engineering and public health while also decreasing the likelihood of 
revolution and political radicalism.166 However, collectivist and state interventionist 
social reform also widened the gap between the social policies of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties and alienated many of the more moderate Liberal party members.167 
Although the Liberal party’s dedication to unpopular social reform measures, and 
their extreme reliance on faddists for support were definite factors in their decline in the 
years flowing the Third Reform Act they are not the only culprits. Just as guilty were the 
organizational problems within the Liberal party. In the years following the Third Reform 
Act, a strong political organization was vital for electoral success. In an election which 
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saw the size of the electorate doubled since the 1867 reforms, it was essential for both 
parties to persuade enough newly enfranchised voters to ensure their own success at the 
polls.168 Despite the existence of the NLF as early as 1877, the Liberal party failed to 
effectively organize their base to support their measures, and further failed to measure the 
temperature of public opinion on the Irish Home Rule question. An anonymous writer 
under the name “Home Ruler” responded to a letter to the editor in Bristol arguing that 
the Liberal party was beaten in the 1886 election because they were not effectively 
organized. The writer claims that “the Liberals could beat the Tories in argument, but the 
Tories beat us in organization.”169 From this letter, it becomes clear that the Liberal party 
believed they suffered from organizational problems that cost them seats in the 1886 
election. A meeting of the Leeds United Liberal Association showed these problems or 
organization were foremost in the minds of the Liberal party leaders. At this meeting, a 
discussion was help over the state of the party, and those in attendance agreed that more 
was needed of the party’s organization to spread the message of the party’s leaders, who 
it was agreed were the wisest and ablest the country had ever known. In particular it was 
pointed out that the weakest part of the Liberal party organization was in voter 
registration.170 The committee noted that it was impossible for one agent to register every 
voter in the entire town, and that it was instead necessary for each Parliamentary division 
to see to registration within their own districts. Further, the committee claimed that the 
Conservative party made use of a more centralized power structure than did the Liberal 
party, and that it was that centralized power structure that had allowed the Conservative 
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party to make such significant gains in 1886.171 The organizational troubles of the Liberal 
party were already evident to them during the 1886 election, as the correspondent from 
the Derby Daily Telegraph pointed out. He noted that the party organization was not 
what it needed to be in 1885, but that some improvement had been made going into the 
1886 election.172 However, even if this prediction of improved party organization had 
proven true, it likely would not have saved the Liberal party, as they had attached 
themselves to an extremely unpopular policy as their main platform in the 1886 election. 
 It was the Irish Home Rule movement that was perhaps the largest indicator of the 
Liberal party’s decline in the latter years of the nineteenth century leading to the election 
of 1886. While the Home Rule movement first emerged in the 1870s, it was not until 
after the enfranchisement of the rural working-class in 1884 that it became a pressing 
concern for British parliament.173 Gladstone came out publicly in favor of Home Rule in 
1885, a move that allowed British parliament to maintain supremacy in the Home Rule 
question by controlling the debate over the question, but forced the Liberal party to 
become dependent upon Irish Nationalist MPs to maintain their power in government.174 
The reason for the Liberal party’s dependence on the Irish Nationalists to maintain power 
was the disappointing electoral returns for Liberal party candidates between 1874 and 
1885. During this period, there was intense criticism of the NLF’s organizational 
methods, with some critics like John Morley MP claiming that the NLF degraded British 
politics to the American style “democracy” of machine politics.175 With some in the 
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Liberal party distrustful of the NLF, the party lacked sufficient organization to effectively 
counter Conservative efforts to increase their standing in the cities and boroughs. This 
situation was made worse by the uncertainty over Gladstone’s future in politics, with 
some expecting him to retire as leader of the Liberal party. When it became clear that 
Gladstone did not yet intend to retire, things did not improve as Gladstone’s Midlothian 
campaign steered the Liberal party towards policy that was hitherto unfamiliar for them. 
Gladstone spoke extensively during this campaign, appealing to the religious sensibilities 
of the British electorate in decrying atrocities in Bulgaria and calling for British 
intervention against the Turks.176 This change to Liberal policy caused the Liberal party 
to lose seats over the following elections, including the 1885 general election, the first 
after the Third Reform Act. Although the Liberal party remained the largest part in 
Parliament following the election, with 333 seats to the Conservative party’s 251 seats, 
the Irish National party led by Charles Parnell won 86 seats, more than enough to shift 
the balance of power. Parnell initially the Parnellites planned to return the Conservative 
party to power, but when Gladstone’s son leaked his father’s intention to introduce an 
Irish Home Rule measure in Parliament the Irish Nationalists were persuaded to form a 
coalition with the Liberal party and keep them in power.177 According to the Nottingham 
Evening Post it was Gladstone’s insistence on Irish Home Rule despite domestic 
opposition in England that led to Mr. Chamberlain and several of his associates leaving 
the Liberal Party and forming the Liberal Unionist Party. Chamberlain and his followers 
needed an efficient organization to be effective as a party and to maintain independence 
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from the Conservative Party.178 This split, however, forced Chamberlain into an alliance 
with the Conservative party leadership.179 According to Lubenow, it is in the split 
between the Gladstonian faction of the Liberal party and the Liberal Unionists under 
Chamberlain and Goschen that the electoral sociological explanation of the Conservative 
ascendancy is most obvious.  Lubenow contended that for the most part, the split between 
Gladstonians and Liberal Unionists came down to self-interest. The Gladstonian faction 
maintained majorities in all sectors of the Liberal party, suggesting that it was political 
rather than social issues that caused the disintegration of the liberal party.180 Of these 
political reasons, the most pressing was the ideological difference between Gladstonians 
and the Whigs who seceded from the party in 1886. These Whigs, who had long been 
considered the more conservative branch of the Liberal party, could not support 
Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule measure and thus felt they had no choice but to join the 
Liberal Unionist cause.181 The Whigs were more likely to be middle-class and Anglican 
than the more radical members of the Liberal party who remained with Gladstone. For 
them, the Irish Home Rule issue was an attack on the Empire, and an attack on property. 
Land reform in Ireland was a major component of Irish Home Rule, and many Whigs felt 
threatened by the prospect of Irish landlords being forced to sell their land.182 
 The largest impact of this split between the Liberal party and the Liberal 
Unionists was to make it easier for the Conservative party to take control of the 
government. The election of 1886 saw more Liberal Unionists stand for election in rural 
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districts, with the Liberal Unionist candidates more closely resemble the Conservative 
party than their erstwhile Liberal party colleagues on the issue of Irish Home Rule.183 
While this could be seen as an indication that the Liberal party split over Home Rule was 
responsible for the Conservative ascendancy, a better explanation is that the Conservative 
party efforts to appeal to the middle-class over issues of Empire and property rights 
sufficiently swayed public opinion enough to make winning an election as a supporter of 
Irish Home Rule a daunting task in many districts. While it cannot be denied that a 
Liberal candidate won election in 192 districts, it must not be overlooked that the Liberal 
lost 127 seats from the 1885 election.184 This shows that the Irish Home Rule movement 
was sufficiently unpopular to cost the Liberal party the election. While the Conservative 
party and the Liberal Unionists did not share an ideological framework, their shared 
opposition to Irish Home Rule was enough common ground to allow a tenuous alliance, 
as the largest source of contention within the ranks of the Liberal party and the Liberal 
Unionists was the opposition of the Liberal Unionist faction to the adoption of Irish 
Home Rule as official party policy.185 
 The trend of defections from the Liberal party to the Liberal Unionists was not 
only something seen among the ranks of parliament; nor was it a movement that was only 
caused by the alienation engendered by the Irish Home Rule crisis. Many rural working-
class voters, newly enfranchised by the Third Reform Act, decided to support the 
Conservative party rather than the seemingly more fitting Liberal party. This influx of 
working-class support for the Conservative party was caused by a conscious effort by the 
                                                          
183 Stephens, “Changing Context,” 492. 
184 “The General Election, 1886,” Western Mail, 19 July 1886. 
185 Stephens, “Changing Context,” 491. 
49 
 
 
 
Conservative party’s political organization to appeal to the working-class by identifying 
themselves with working-class urban culture and presenting the Conservative party as the 
defender of that culture.186 
 As has been stated before, the implementation of the Third Reform Acts caused 
Gladstone to introduce Irish Home Rule as an official policy of the Liberal party. The 
1885 election saw the Liberal party lose seats to the Conservatives and become 
dependent on the Irish Nationalists to remain the governing party. The ideological 
opposition to Irish Home Rule made it easier for Liberal Unionists to form a tenuous 
alliance with the Conservative party.187 This alliance between the two parties also made it 
easier for the working-class to support the Conservative party, as it no longer was 
apparent that the Liberal party was the party that best represented their interests. As such, 
working-class conservatism played a significant role in the Conservative party’s success 
in the late-Victorian period.188 To gain the support of those working-class voters the 
Conservative party deliberately associated themselves with aspects of urban society like 
the pub, racing, and football to distinguish themselves from the moral reforming Liberal 
party.189 This was done through the founding of political clubs, which put as much 
emphasis on organizing parties and socials as they did on organizing voter registration 
drives.190 Doing this ingratiated the Conservative party with the newly enfranchised 
urban working-class electorate, while gradually familiarizing them with political 
organization and participation. Perhaps the most important aspect of this campaign to 
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gain the support of the urban working-class was the Conservative party’s defense of the 
drink. Working-class identity was closely associated with the pub, and as such their 
politics revolved heavily around the ‘beer barrel.’191 While the Liberal party was 
dedicated to its ‘crusade against sin,’ the Conservative party dedicated itself to defense of 
drink and popular sport, elements which were vital to the identity of the urban working-
class.192 
 In summation, the Liberal party experienced a significant decline in the final two 
decades of the Victorian period. This decline, and the ultimate schism of the party caused 
by Gladstone’s support of Irish Home Rule played a large role in the Conservative 
ascendancy from 1886-1906. Although it was the Irish Home Rule Crisis that caused the 
Liberal party schism, there were already tensions within the party prior to 1886. Despite 
continuing to maintain the power in the government, the Liberal party had been 
increasing unpopular during the 1870s and 1880s as they became more entrenched with 
the faddists; single-issue pressure groups who used their influence to halt progress in 
Parliament until their pet issues were acted upon. This inability to enact legislation 
because of partisan maneuvering led to the distrust of party politics for fear that they 
would become similar to the “wire-pulling” machine politics of the American style. This 
fear of the Liberal party organization becoming nothing more than machine politics left 
the Liberal party unprepared for new electoral realities, and the Conservative party was 
able to use their centralized party organization to increased registration and persuade 
significant numbers of the agricultural working-class to vote for Conservative candidates. 
This was more easily done because of Gladstone’s insistence on Irish Home Rule. In a 
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period with a rising nationalistic mood and heightened pride in the Empire, Gladstone’s 
advocacy of Home Rule seemed like an affront the Englishness, and thus made support of 
Home Rule unpalatable for many. This feeling was not limited to just British voters, as 
many Liberal MPs were unable to support Gladstone in his crusade for Irish Home and 
abandoned the party for the Liberal Unionist camp rather than compromise their beliefs 
about the Empire. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
 
POPULAR OPINION AND THE IRISH HOME RULES CRISIS 
 
 
 The Irish Home Rule Crisis was perhaps the most pressing and contentious 
political crisis of the late-Victorian period. Although the desire by some for Irish Home 
Rule had been present almost from the beginning of unification with Britain, the Irish 
Home Rule Movement did not reach zenith until the late nineteenth century with the 
growth of Irish national sentiment. The growth of this nationalistic sentiment in turn 
fueled the development of a political party dedicated to Irish Home Rule. This dedication 
can be seen in the January 1886 meeting of the Irish Parliamentary Party, in which 
members met to affirm their belief in legislative rights for Ireland, and to thank T.P. 
O’Connor for organizing Irish voters in Great Britain for their cause.193 Further, the 
extension of working class enfranchisement into the counties and the parliamentary seat 
redistribution of the Third Reform Act forced the Irish Home Rule issue into the forefront 
of British politics, as the democratization of Ireland’s boroughs and cities meant that 
from 1884, 80 percent of Irish MPs were supporters of Irish Home Rule.194 It was this 
party, led by Charles Stewart Parnell that the Liberal party under the leadership of 
William Ewart Gladstone sought a coalition with to maintain control of government. The 
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growth of Parnell’s party, the Irish National Party, was spurred in part by the resurgence 
of Irish national identity, as evidenced by an increased interest in the Irish language, Irish 
literature and music, and traditional Irish culture.195 This Gaelic revival was responsible 
for the Irish coming to see themselves as culturally distinct from the rest of Britain.196 As 
one writer notes in Freeman’s Journal and Daily Commercial Advertiser the “knowledge 
of the Irish language…ought to be the first object of an Irish Nationalists young 
ambition.”197 This cultural nationalism began to take root in the Irish youth in the last two 
decades of the nineteenth centuries and was seen as a spiritual successor to the Young 
Ireland movement.198 The Gaelic League, which developed out of the Gaelic revival was 
an effort to restore and cultivate the Irish language, which by the late nineteenth century 
was dying out; only being spoken in a few districts throughout Ireland.199 The Gaelic 
Athletic Association (GAA) also sought to promote Irish culture, by encouraging Irish 
youth to participate in traditional Irish sport, such as football, hammer throw, hurling, and 
camogie.200 These two organizations were representative of the cultural nationalism in 
Ireland at the time, with the GAA calling traditional English games such as lawn tennis 
and cricket alien, and the Gaelic League referring to those indifferent about the Irish 
language “West Britons.”201 This cultural nationalism was a response to British thought 
in the late nineteenth century. The Social-Darwinist, racist, nativist thought viewed the 
Irish as an “inferior, simian-featured, irresponsible, irrational, and emotional subspecies 
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incapable of managing their own affairs.”202 Out of this racist British ideology came the 
Irish desire to prove their own cultural distinctiveness.203 
 In the late Victorian period, after the passage of the Third Reform Act, the Irish 
Home Rule Crisis became one of national significance. It was during this period that 
politics became more democratic, both in England and the “Celtic fringe” of Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales. As such, there was more of a need to appeal to the desires of the 
working classes. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century Britain was 
experiencing a prolonged economic decline and voters in Scotland and Wales were more 
concerned with bread-and-butter issues than with matters of Ireland and the empire. The 
result of this was the regionalization of politics in Britain, with the Conservative and 
Liberal parties dominating England and the “Celtic fringe,” respectively.204 Despite this 
attempt to appeal to the desires of the electorate however, the Liberal party was divided 
over the matter of Home Rule, with a faction breaking away and forming the Liberal 
Unionist party over the matter of Ireland remaining a fully incorporated part of the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, the Irish Home Rule Crisis highlights the new nature of popular 
politics in the two decades following the passage of the Third Reform Act. It was at this 
time that politics in Britain were become more, rather than less, populist as the two major 
parties struggled to grasp the new challenges of mass politics. By necessity, politicians 
had to bow to electoral logic, and cater to the measures that their constituencies found 
important.205 
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 Though the union of 1801 had brought Ireland into a political union with the 
United Kingdom, it was never fully integrated into the British system.206 The British 
government encouraged Ireland to expand its agricultural production, but did little to 
address the grievances of Irish farmers such as continually increasing rents and the 
inability of Irish tenant farmers to rise above the system of landlordism and own the land 
they worked.207 Furthermore, the British did little to ease the tensions between Catholics 
and Protestants in Ireland. A Catholic Emancipation Bill was passed in 1828, giving all 
Catholics in Britain the right to vote in general elections and to hold seats in Parliament. 
Although the majority of the Irish population was Catholic, the Catholic emancipation 
actually decreased the size of the Irish electorate, as an accompanying parliamentary bill 
increased the property requirements from the franchise from two pounds to ten pounds in 
Ireland.208 The discontent of the Irish over the perceived cultural and economic 
indifference of the British government allowed violent radical groups, such as the Fenian 
Brotherhood to take root in Ireland, protesting rural rents and the religious tithes.209 
Despite efforts of the Gladstone government to mitigate the influence of the Fenian 
Brotherhood through conciliation, fifty-nine Irish constituencies returned Home Rule 
MPs, and advocated for a return of the Irish parliament.210 Efforts to conciliate Ireland 
failed, and the nation was soon polarized between the Catholic-Nationalist majority, and 
the Protestant minority in Ulster who wished to remain in the Union. Once given the 
vote, and allowed to sit in Parliament, the Irish Catholics formed the Home Rule Party, 
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advocating for Irish self-government. After 1885 this party held to balance of power in 
the House of Commons, and forced a coalition with the Liberal government, as the 
number of Liberal party MPs was not sufficient to maintain a majority had Parnell chosen 
to align his party with the Conservatives, as had been the plan prior to Gladstone 
supporting Home Rule.211  
 The Irish question was the predominating issue in British politics in the final two 
decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century.212 In 
fact, the issue of Home Rule did more to define the identities of the major political parties 
of the late Victorian period than any other issue.213 It is during this period that the issue of 
Irish Home Rule was taken up by the Liberal party under Gladstone in an attempt to unify 
the party.214 Gladstone believed that the Liberal Party was close to fracture and that the 
call to action provided by the issue of Home Rule would deliver the necessary 
momentum to energize the party and keep all its constituent parts together.215 The Liberal 
politician Chamberlain wrote that Gladstone: 
Did not conceal that his present interest was in the Irish question, and he 
seemed to think that a policy for dealing with it might be found which would 
unite us all and which would necessarily throw into the background those 
minor points of difference about the schools and small holdings which 
threated to drive the Whigs into the arms of the Tories or into retirement.216 
 
Hamer argues that Gladstone’s plan to unify the party through taking up the issue of the 
Irish question backfired however; one third of Liberal MPs rebelled in 1886, forming the 
Liberal Unionist Party over their opposition to Gladstone and Irish Home Rule.217 Chief 
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among their criticisms of Gladstone was that “Ireland blocks the way” of progress. The 
Liberal Unionists believed that Gladstone had become obsessed with the idea of Irish 
Home Rule, and that because of that obsession, domestic politics were suffering.218 The 
deep divisions between the Gladstonian Liberals and Liberal Unionists over the issue of 
Home Rule was one of the main causes of the Liberal loss of power after 1885.219 
The Conservatives were in power from 1886-1906 and believed that there could 
be no middle ground on the issue of Home Rule. They believed that there could only be 
government from Westminster, or government from Dublin.220 Conservative sentiment 
was that the Irish would not be content with anything less than full independence.221 
 Far from a monolithic face of support however, the Irish were as equally divided 
over the issue of Home Rule as the British. Many Irish Protestants in the north of Ireland 
supported continuing close ties with Westminster. Many of these supporters of the union 
were descended from the English conquerors of Ireland, and their opposition to Home 
Rule fits into a broader imperial mindset best summed up in the question “How can the 
British hope to hold India if they cannot even hold Ireland?”222 These supporters of union 
were so determined to prevent Home Rule that they threatened to resort to violence 
should Parliament pass and enforce a Home Rule Bill.223 As Conservative MP Lord 
Randolph Churchill wrote: “Ulster will fight; Ulster will be right.”224 
                                                          
218 Hamer, “The Irish Question,” 521. 
219 Hamer, “The Irish Question,” 524. 
220 Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 32-33. 
221 Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 33. 
222 Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 33. 
223 Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 32. 
224 Kelly, “Home Rule for Ireland,” 32. 
58 
 
 
 
 Many Irish citizens also opposed Home Rule on the grounds that it was based on 
political despotism.225 Many Irish people viewed their homeland as a subjugated colony 
of England.226 They believed that the British introduced oppressive political structures 
onto the Irish to promote English interests over the interests of the Irish.227 These Irish 
citizens viewed Ireland as a nation under occupation, and obeisance to Home Rule would 
validate their servitude.228 This sentiment gave rise to the nationalist movement that 
eventually pushed for full Irish independence in the early twentieth century.229 
 Perhaps the largest impact of the Irish Home Rule Crisis upon British politics in 
the late-Victorian period was the division and decline of the Liberal party. According to 
the historian W.C. Lubenow, the class alignment of the two major political parties was 
the most striking feature of late-Victorian politics. As such, the Liberal Unionist party 
formed as a halfway-house for middle-class Liberals to transition to the Conservative 
party as they could no longer support Gladstone over the matter of Irish Home Rule.230 
While Gladstone’s contemporaries favored a social conflict theory approach when 
examining the reasons for the defection to the Liberal Unionist Party, more recent 
scholarship from Biagini, Lawrence, and Lubenow has tended to prefer a more political 
rather than societal explanation. Eugenio Biagini argues that the Liberal party split was 
caused wholly by Gladstone’s adoption of the Irish Home Rule cause, going so far as to 
claim it is generally regarded as one of his worst mistakes. He continues that Home Rule 
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was not a policy that was adopted rationally after considering all possible alternatives, but 
rather that it was an aging leader’s personal obsession. Biagini echoes T. W. Heyk’s 
sentiments claiming that his support of Irish Home Rule split the party and cost him the 
support of the working-class.231 Contrary to Biagini and Heyk, Stephen Lee argues that 
the Liberal party schism was caused by Gladstone’s management of the party rather than 
any ideological differences. According to Lee, Gladstone introduced the Irish Home Rule 
measure to unify the party around himself and thwart the ascendance of Chamberlain and 
his Radical policies.232 However, the rapid adoption of Radical policies following the 
departure of the Liberal Unionists would seem to disprove this argument. Instead, 
Lawrence argues that the Irish Home Rule crisis was the cause of the Liberal party split, 
with Liberal Unionists unable to support Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule measure, and the 
Gladstonian hardliners refusing to move off Irish Home Rule as their first priority.233 
While there was a clear split in the Liberal party over the issue of Irish Home Rule, it is 
difficult to find a vote in which social reasons were the cause of the split. Instead, the 
split was over political reasons. Lubenow argues that Gladstone controlled the majority 
of all social classes represented by the Liberal party of the time, suggesting that political 
rather than social reasons were the cause of the Liberal Party split.234 This shows that 
social differences are not what separated the Liberal party in 1886. Rather it was political 
issues, which were the effects of the Third Reform Act.  
 Before a discussion of the effects of the Liberal party split can be discussed at 
length, there must first be an exploration of the cause for the split and Gladstone’s 
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adamant support of Irish Home Rule. Lee argues that Gladstone supported Irish Home 
Rule because he desired to reclaim the reforming initiative from the Conservative party 
but did not wish to tackle the social reform measures that were being put forward by 
Chamberlain and the Radical wing of the party. Lee continues, claiming that Gladstone 
was troubled by what he saw as the growing factionalism of the Liberal party, and desired 
to embrace a major national issue in the hopes that it would unify the Liberal party.235 
However, while Gladstone’s distress over factionalism may be well-documented, his lack 
of desire to tackle Radical social reforms should not be accepted as his reason for 
supporting Irish Home Rule because in the years following the split the Liberal party 
adopted those radical measures.236 According to Jason Belcher, Home Rule support 
would not imply independence from Britain but did allow Ireland to control a greater 
measure of its own affairs, including gaining a stronger voice in the British government. 
Meanwhile, the present state of devolution did not allow for Irish politicians to exert an 
active voice in parliamentary proceedings. Gladstone viewed devolution as beneficial to 
British Parliament because it meant that he could represent Irish interests by allowing 
them self-governance while simultaneously “cleansing” the House of Commons from an 
unstable element of the Irish Nationalists.237 
Furthermore, and perhaps as a result of this Liberal party split, the two major 
political parties became much more regional parties than had previously been the case. 
Following the 1886 Irish Home Rule Crisis and Liberal party split, the Liberal party was 
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strongest in Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and major industrial areas of England, with the 
Conservative party stronghold being in England. This Conservative party hold over 
England was further strengthened by the additional of the Unionist caucus of the Liberal 
party joining them in all but name. The Aberdeen Journal predicted this alliances gave 
the Conservative bloc a majority of 118 seats, with the Gladstonian Liberals and Irish 
Nationalists only able to muster 282 seats.238 The Ipswich Journal showed similar results 
with four English and one Welsh seats at Staffordshire, King’s County, Yorkshire, Down, 
and Carnarvonshire flipping from the Liberal party to either the Conservatives or 
Unionists.239 The Pall Mall Gazette enforced this claim by showing that of the 407 seats 
won by a Liberal or Unionist candidates in England, Scotland, and Wales, the Unionists 
candidates were victorious in 63 percent of cases despite winning the majority of those 
seats in both Wales and Scotland.240 This trend follows earlier observations that the 
Conservative party was more dominant among the landed classes, and the Liberal party 
held sway among the working classes. However, due to the Conservative party’s appeal 
to Empire, and Chamberlain’s defection on the issue of Irish Home Rule, the 1886 
election became more of an election of the dominant English Conservative majority 
against the Liberal strongholds in urban centers and Wales and the Irish Nationalists in 
Ireland, with the exception of Ulster. This is evidenced by the following map.241  
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242 
 
The result of the Irish Home Rule crisis and the consequent political realignment was a 
contributing factor in the decline of the Liberal party and the subsequent Conservative 
ascendancy of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods. This realignment was enabled 
by the Third Reform Act, which created the circumstances necessary for the Liberal party 
split. By expanding the electorate, the Third Reform Act shrank the differences between 
the Conservative and Liberal parties, makes it easier for Liberals to defect first to the 
Liberal Unionist faction, and then ultimately to the Conservative party.243 
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 Furthermore, the Third Reform Act had another, longer lasting impact on the 
execution of politics in the years following the Irish Home Rule Crisis in 1886. In the 
earlier Victorian period canvassing for jobs, commonly referred to as “jobbing” was not 
seen as political corruption in Ireland but rather part of the political culture. However, 
Irish Nationalists claimed that jobbing was a form of political prostitution and that the 
Act of Union only passed in Ireland because of promises of government favors.244 Those 
Irish Nationalists, led by Parnell, gained increased influence in Parliament following the 
Third Reform Act, as increased enfranchisement in Ireland and the redistribution of seats 
meant the return of more Nationalist MPs. In the early 1880s jobbing took place amongst 
Irish MPs but faced criticism from anti-Parnellites. After the Third Reform Act and the 
Irish Home Rule Crisis this patronage dried up as the newly elected Unionist government 
was unsympathetic to Nationalist concerns.245 However, during the Gladstone ministry of 
1892-5 there was more evidence of Nationalist MPs  participating in patronage, 
suggesting that their pledge not to do so was not taken seriously when confronted with 
the opportunity for advancement by a favorable government.246 This provides further 
evidence to the claim that the Third Reform Act and Irish Home Rule Crisis created a 
new political system that was regional in nature. In the years preceding the Home Rule 
crisis, jobbing was commonplace, but then dried up in the years following the election of 
1886. While this could simply be written off as Nationalist MPs taking their oath not to 
accept patronage more seriously, the fact that jobbing resurfaces in the period 1892-1895 
suggests that it was instead the new, regional focus of politics that was to blame. The 
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dominant Conservative and Unionist government had no interest in the Nationalist 
concerns, and therefore did not reward them with jobs. 
 The Third Reform Act played a final, major role in the development of the Irish 
Home Rule Crisis. In the years before the extension of the franchise, British politics had 
been conducted in a manner that valued “man over measure.” The result of this shift was 
that the increased democratization of British politics created an environment in which 
Irish Home Rule became an important electoral issue. Candidates standing for election 
representing the Conservative party campaigned on the notion of Empire, while Liberal 
party candidates instead campaigned on giving Ireland the freedom to manage their own 
affairs internally. 
 For the Liberal party, the concept of popular liberalism had for a while been about 
democracy. For them, Home Rule was a natural extension of that democracy into 
Ireland.247 Because of the franchise extension in 1867, and again in 1884-5, the 
traditional mode of politics gave way to the advent of the caucus. One the one hand it was 
argued that the caucus diminished politics by trading educated voters for the uninformed 
masses blindly following the party line, but on the other the caucus allowed for more 
effective party organization and mobilization of voters.248 This new caucus model of 
politics brought the issue of Irish Home Rule to the forefront of British politics. This 
sentiment is echoed in a report by the Aberdeen Weekly Journal from June 1887, which 
saw Gladstone delivered a four and a half hour speech championing Irish Home Rule, 
and further informed readers of the efforts of the Liberal caucus in disrupting the efforts 
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of the Conservative and Unionist meetings.249 This effort to disrupt the meetings of the 
opposition was a demonstration of the power of the caucus in politics following the 
passage of the Third Reform Act. The NLF was among the major Liberal party 
organization of the time, and was ultimately the first instance that rank-and-file party 
members had an opportunity to challenge party leadership over the policy and priorities 
of the party. The NLF did not challenge Gladstone over the issue of Irish Home Rule 
though. Instead, they stuck to Gladstone’s policy with almost religious zeal despite the 
ultimate electoral unpopularity of the Home Rule proposal.250 
 The Liberal party was not the only party to have an effective organization 
advocating for Irish Home Rule in the 1880s. The Irish National League was the first 
mass organization for the Irish Nationalists and drew on long Irish tradition by appealing 
to county conventions for political support. By this method the INL was able to transform 
the Home Rule movement in Ireland into a well-knit, modern political party.251 It was 
through the efforts of the INL mobilizing newly enfranchised voters in Ireland that the 
Home Rule movement was able to first elect MPs to represent them in Westminster. As 
reported in the Leeds Mercury, the INL celebrated electoral success in the 1885 election 
by gaining two hard-fought seats and forcing the Nationalists in Ulster into an alliance 
with the Irish Parliamentary party. According to John Dillon, the result of this victory 
was to eliminate divisions within the Irish Home Rule movement in Ireland, leaving, as 
John Dillon put it, “There would now be in Ireland only the Irish party and the 
English.”252 This victory was claimed to be the largest victory in Irish politics since the 
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days of Grattan, and that the Liberal party leader, who championed Home Rule would 
look to the unanimity of Ireland as his justification.253 
 The caucus politics model created by the Third Reform Act had the result of 
leaving political organizations, especially the NLF in charge of shaping party policy over 
the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century. These party machines did much to 
increase democratic activity in Britain and Ireland, and by the nature of their operation 
moved the policy of their respective political parties more in line with the opinion of their 
rank-and-file members.254 
 In summation, the Third Reform Act had several impacts on British politics that 
were brought to greater prominence as a result of the Irish Home Rule Crisis. The Third 
Reform Act brought greater enfranchisement for the working classes and also drastically 
redistributed parliamentary seats, instituting the modern single-member constituency. 
This had the effect of creating a system in which candidates standing for election then 
had to appeal more directly to the desires of their constituencies. The consequence of this 
political shift was the regionalization of the Conservative and Liberal parties into 
England and the Celtic fringe respectively. Although the Liberal party did maintain some 
strength in the industrialized areas of England, it largely lost numbers in the nation as a 
whole, as the conservative party was more efficiently able to appeal to the working-class 
desire to maintain the Empire than was the Liberal party at appealing to the moral outrage 
of denying Ireland the right to govern themselves. Furthermore, the Third Reform Act 
was at least partially responsible for the Liberal party split of 1886 at the height of the 
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Irish Home Rule Crisis. The efforts to appeal to an increased electorate had the effect of 
bringing the Conservative and Liberal parties closer together ideologically, which made it 
easier for the disillusioned Liberals to defect first to the Liberal Union party, and then 
later to the Conservative party. This ease of defection was especially seen in 1886, when 
Gladstone’s insistence on pressing the Home Rule issue became inconvenient for recently 
elected MPs. More Liberal MPs were in seats considered to be vulnerable than were their 
Conservative counterparts and many were hesitant to stand for election again so soon 
after the 1885 election. As a result, many of those recently elected, vulnerable Liberal 
MPs chose to defect to the Unionist cause, as it was in their political best interest. Finally, 
the Third Reform Act created a political system in which political parties were more 
dependent on effective organization for electoral success. As a result of the redistribution 
of seats in parliament and the extension of the franchise, this meant that the Irish MPs 
held the balance of power in Parliament. Irish Home Rule was thrust to the fore of British 
politics by these political machines, which leveraged popular democratic sentiment, 
especially in Ireland, for the creation of Home Rule measures. The importance of this 
development is two-fold. First, it saw the evolution of British politics from a game of 
“man over measures” in which MPs were elected based on their personal integrity to a 
system in which candidates had to pay more attention to the opinions of their people. 
Second, the development of the caucus finally gave rank-and-file party members an 
opportunity to shape party policy rather than accept the party line dictated to them by the 
party elites. Although the NLF initially followed Gladstone’s policy religiously, by the 
1890s it was in a position to dictate party policy. These developments were in line with 
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the longstanding ideals of popular democracy that were responsible for the passage of the 
Third Reform Act. 
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CHAPTER V  
 
 
SOCIOPOLITICAL PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE THIRD REFORM ACT 
 
 
Political pressure groups have long been a part of British politics. From the very 
beginning of Victoria’s reign these groups have pressured the government for greater 
power, more representation in government, or for government action in favor of some 
social or political cause they championed. Patricia Hollis argues that by 1867 pressure 
groups had become a necessary aid to government which evidenced healthy public 
concern, expanded the arena of government and widened access to government.255 In his 
work on the middle-class Radical experience Paul Adelman shows the power of pressure 
groups through the campaigns of the Nonconformist National Education League. 
Adelman asserts that the methods of the Nonconformist pressure group were too 
antagonistic and contributed at least in small part to the Liberal party defeat in the 1874 
election.256 Stephen J. Lee states that Evangelical and Dissenting pressure groups had 
petitioned Whig MPs for reform and had collaborated with them in executing those 
reforms in the 1830s, but that the willingness of Whigs to impose repressive measures 
against Chartist activity provoked working-class hostility, and alienated Evangelicals and 
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Dissenters to the extent that many of them voted Conservative in 1841.257 Pressure 
groups occupied a place of extreme importance in Victorian politics, often acting as a 
guiding force for party policy. Indeed, this can be seen from the earliest days of 
Victoria’s reign, with the publication of the People’s Charter in 1838. This charter, the 
first to call for widespread electoral reform, demanded the franchise be extended to 
universal manhood suffrage, institute the secret ballot, eliminate property requirement for 
MPs and ensure their payment, redistribute seats in Parliament, and hold annual 
Parliamentary elections.258 Although the Chartist movement did not yield immediate 
results in the 1830 or 1840s, it did set a precedent for political and social groups to 
pressure the government to address their concerns. Through continued pressure on 
Parliament throughout the Victorian period, the Chartists and their successors ultimately 
achieved most of the demands set forth in the People’s Charter. According to Lee, the 
property qualification for MPs was abolished in 1859, the secret ballot was introduced in 
1872, MPs were paid a salary beginning in 1911, and the franchise acts of 1918 and 1928 
made suffrage universal and made adjustments for more equal electoral districts. Thus, in 
less than a century from its introduction almost all demands of the People’s Charter had 
been met.259 
 Over the course of the Victorian period, political and social pressure groups 
became more influential on the course of parliamentary politics. Following the franchise 
expansion of the Second Reform Act, and especially following the franchise reform and 
redistribution of the Third Reform Act in the 1880s, these political pressure groups 
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became a much more prevalent player on the political landscape. Certain reforms and 
ideological views of these pressure groups became ingrained in the political platforms of 
the two major political parties of the time, especially for the Liberal party.260 Still more of 
those groups pressured Parliament from the outside, urging action on measures to bring 
Britain more in line with their visions of the ideal. 
  In this chapter, the focus will be placed on sociopolitical pressure groups urging 
change both domestically and throughout the wider Empire. During this period, the 
pressure groups most prevalent are those in the realm of religious reform and moral 
issues. On the liberal side of politics were those pressing for the disestablishment, 
education reform, and temperance. Additionally, those who sought to end or curtail 
Britain’s imperial efforts, especially around the Boer War at the close of the nineteenth 
century, turned to the Liberal Party. Conversely, those pressure groups which identified 
with the conservative side of politics were likely to push for a greater expansion of the 
Empire. These conservative pressure groups were also likely to support what has been 
seen as the traditional idea of Britishness. They fought against the disestablishment of the 
Church and attempts by the Liberal party to control the morality of the British people. As 
such, they clung to their defense of the drink and popular entertainment such as football. 
As Jon Lawrence points out, the defense of “the pleasures of the people,” especially the 
drink and sport were a central part of Tory electoral strategy. In his analysis of politics in 
Wolverhampton Lawrence argues:  
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certainly it was only when the drink issue came to the fore that Conservatives 
were able to win significant support from voters in the depressed and 
impoverished wards of the ‘east end.’…The strong connections between 
Wolverhampton Toryism and professional sports carried similar overtones, 
and culminates in the Tory stranglehold over the affairs of Wolverhampton 
Wanderers football club in the 1890s, and the high profile manipulation of 
the team (and its players) in the Tory cause at Parliamentary elections.261 
 
Thus, the Conservative party used their connection to, and defense of, elements of 
popular entertainment to endear themselves to the working-class and gain sufficient 
support to take seats from Liberal candidates. 
In the final two decades of the Victorian era, following the ratification of the 
Third Reform Act, the political climate was such that sociopolitical pressure groups were 
able to have a much more prominent role in politics than had previously been the case. 
This increased role in politics is demonstrated in two key ways: the first being the 
incorporation of the demands of these groups into the political platforms of both the 
Liberal and Conservative parties, and the second being the changed dialogue of 
politicians in the years following 1885. It was during those years that party activism took 
hold and politicians made a more concerted effort to appeal to the desires of their 
constituents to ensure victory in an era of single-member constituencies.262 
Paul Adelman claims that following the general election the Liberal party became 
more, rather than less radical. He argues that this is demonstrated by the ‘Newcastle 
Programme’ of 1891, which consisted of myriad radical demands such as Irish Home 
Rule, Welsh disestablishment, land, tax, and local government reforms, and reduction of 
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the Lords’ powers, all of which were implemented due to pressure from without the 
party.263 Here Adelman shows that political pressure groups wield sufficient power to 
directly influence party politics. 
Much like Adelman, Michael Barker sees a prominent role for political pressure 
groups in the development of politics in late Victorian Britain. In his work detailing the 
relationship between Gladstone and Radical politics, Barker gives a significant discussion 
over the role of Nonconformist pressure groups on the Liberal party. According to 
Barker, the Nonconformists were instrumental in the push for education reform and it 
was their twin belief in public control of schools and nondenominational teaching that 
became key to the Liberal party’s policy regarding religion and education. Barker 
continues by claiming that the NLF was dominated by Nonconformists by June 1891, and 
that any reforms in the realms of education was naturally be shaped the influence of the 
Nonconformists.264 
Rohan McWilliam takes a similar view of the impact of popular pressure groups. 
In quoting the work of John Vincent, he argues that liberalism was nothing without the 
single-issue interest groups (often called faddists) pushing forward the program of reform 
around the figure of Gladstone.265 Thus, McWilliam argues that while Gladstone was 
responsible in part for empowering the popular pressure groups, they were in turn 
responsible for giving him power to govern. 
D G Wright takes a different perspective on the issue of radicalism and the impact 
of political pressure groups. Wright does not see a significant change in the relationship 
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between government and pressure groups in the years following the Third Reform Act. 
Instead he argues that this trend could be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, and even into the eighteenth century and the political agitation following in the 
wake of the French Revolution.266 
In his work on the temperance movement in Victorian Britain, Brian Howard Harrison 
tends to agree with Wright’s assessment of the role of pressure groups. Although 
Harrison’s analysis is limited in scope to just the temperance movement, he does show 
that pressure groups played a significant role in British politics before the passage of the 
Third Reform Act. According to Harrison: 
The years 1871-2 mark a turning-point in temperance history. Politicians had 
to grapple directly with the popular pressure group whose influence had been 
mounting in the provinces since the 1830s…These years also saw an 
important shift in party attitudes to the drink questions; in 1871-2 Gladstone’s 
great administration was beginning to lose impetus, and enthusiasts for the 
alleged ‘Conservative reaction’ magnified the government’s every mistake.267 
 
Through this analysis Harrison shows that not only were popular pressure groups a 
prominent part of politics in the years before the Third Reform Act, but rather that those 
popular pressure groups were also capable of exerting enough influence to force action 
on those issues, as Harrison explains that Gladstone introduced a bill addressing the drink 
issue in the 1872 parliament.268 
 Agreeing with this sentiment, Andrew S Thompson wrote in 2000 that a more 
nuanced approach should be taken to the matter of anti-imperialist sentiment in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Thompson, anti-imperialism never 
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gained more than a limited and conditional foothold in Britain in the years before 1914, 
and that anti-imperialists did not call for the complete dismantling of the colonial system, 
but rather the prevention of further territorial acquisition and the efficient government of 
the Empire.269 Thompson does not see a significant impact on the growth of the anti-
imperialist movement coming from the Boer War, instead arguing that although anti-
imperialism did resurface around the turn of the twentieth century, the resurgence was not 
large enough to have any measurable impact other than to disrupt the Edwardian Labour 
movement.270 Thus, while Thompson accepts that there was an increase in anti-
imperialist sentiment in the aftermath of the Boer War, he rejects that the anti-imperialists 
had an impact on British politics during the same period. 
 Although historical opinion seems to be divided on the impact of political 
pressure groups in the years following the Third Reform Act, their impact must not be 
overlooked. The twenty years following the Third Reform Act are commonly referred to 
as the Conservative ascendancy and that rise to power was in large possible because of 
the impact of social and political pressure groups. These groups heavily influenced the 
platforms of both parties, with mixed results. The Conservative party was able to win 
working-class support thanks in large part to their defense of “traditional” English values 
such as the drink, the Church, and popular entertainment like football.271 This was a 
direct response to the Liberal party becoming heavily involved with the moral reform 
movement favored by pressure groups. Unfortunately for the Liberal party, this led to 
their fall from grace following the Irish Home Rule Crisis.  
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 It cannot be denied that political and social pressure groups existed before the 
Third Reform Act, and indeed even before the Second Reform Act. It can even be argued 
that these pressure groups played some role on the development of politics in Victorian 
Britain, as evidenced by the widespread demonstrations in Britain. According to 
newspapers from the time, the summer of 1838 saw significant demonstrations in support 
of the People’s Charter in major industrial cities such as London, Bath, Newcastle-upon-
Tyne, as well as minor settlements like Trowbridge.272 However, this relatively high level 
of political activity did not translate into action on the part of parliament. In 1842, a 
petition of over three million signatures was presented to Parliament urging action in 
favor of the People’s Charter and universal suffrage. This petition was ultimately ignored 
by government though, as the Northern Star states:  
Three and half millions have quietly, orderly, soberly, peaceably but firmly 
asked of their rulers to do justice; and their rulers have turned a deaf ear to 
that protest. Three and a half millions of people have asked permission to 
detail their wrongs, and enforce their claims for RIGHT, and the 'House' has 
resolved they should not be heard! Three and a half millions of the slave-
class have holden out the olive branch of peace to the enfranchised and 
privileged classes and sought for a firm and compact union, on the principle 
of EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW; and the enfranchised and privileged 
have refused to enter into a treaty! The same class is to be a slave class still. 
The mark and brand of inferiority is not to be removed. The assumption of 
inferiority is still to be maintained. The people are not to be free.273 
 
The failure of the Chartist movement despite such widespread support shows that 
although political and social pressure groups were active in the years before the Third 
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Reform Act, the political climate was not yet one in which the voice of the working-
classes was particularly valued, as the franchise was still limited to the middle-classes 
following the Reform Act of 1832. 
 In the years following the ratification of the Third Reform Act, political and social 
pressure groups had much more success petitioning government to address their 
grievances. Education reform, namely the establishing of free education not dominated 
by the Church of England in Britain, had been something desired by many groups such as 
the National Education League and the Liberation Society since the mid-Victorian era. 
Although the Education Act of 1870 did establish free elementary education in England 
and Wales, it was not until 1885 that the cause of the Nonconformist Liberation Society 
and National Education League was taken up by government. It was then that 
Chamberlain’s Radical Programme came about, championing causes that were previously 
only considered by fringe pressure groups.274 Indeed, the Liberation Society itself sees 
the Third Reform Act as a watershed moment for the cause of free education and 
disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of England. As the leaders of the 
Liberation Society said in a meeting held 13 January 1885:  
If an election was to take place by the unreformed constituencies still the 
growth of the sentiment of the country on this question of religious equality 
would have entitled the society to make this a question to be brought before 
the Legislature. In the new constituencies voters would come in a manner 
never before contemplated. Therefore. Whether the opinions of the society 
were the opinions of the majority or not it was well that they should test what 
is the opinion of the majority…If, as he believed, the great majority of the 
popular forces throughout the country were in harmony with them, in 
agreeing that religious equality is a sound principle, still more was it their 
duty not to be hesitating, not to be timid, but to determine at the next election 
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this great question should occupy its proper place in the Liberal 
programme.275 
 
This shows that the enfranchisement and redistribution provisions of the Third Reform 
Act created a system in which the will of the majority was more important than it had 
been in the years before its ratification. 
 This can also be seen through Chamberlain’s promise to introduce temperance 
legislation into Parliament in 1886. The United Kingdom Alliance had been active in 
Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century advocating for the institution of 
legislation regulating the sale of alcohol throughout the nation. Following the franchise 
reform and seat redistribution of the Third Reform Act, Chamberlain promised to 
introduce legislation in favor of the temperance issue.276 Although Chamberlain claimed 
he was not able to promise details of the form the bill was to take, he did promise that a 
temperance bill would be introduced in the upcoming parliament, and that he would share 
the details of said bill once they became available. 
 The fight over temperance can also be used to highlight the second major way the 
Third Reform Act changed the way that sociopolitical pressure groups and the 
government interacted with the people and with each other. It was in the years following 
the Third Reform Act that political discourse became more democratic, with politicians 
speaking more directly to the will of the people, abandoning the ‘man over measures’ 
form of politics that had been prevalent in earlier political eras. This can be seen in a 
report of a Liberal Association meeting in which Mr. Hoare spoke directly about the 
temperance issue. In this meeting, Mr. Hoare claimed that rather than outright abolition 
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of alcohol he favored the local option, the transfer of authority over alcohol to locally 
elected boards. He claimed that this should be enough to satisfy those in the Liberal party 
who advocated strongest for temperance, and that such a move was necessary because 
despite the relatively small percentage of the larger party that the temperance faction 
made up, they were instrumental in deciding who stood for election in any given 
constituency.277 This is further evidenced by a meeting held at Chester earlier in the 
decade by Herbert Gladstone, MP. This meeting, organized by the United Kingdom 
Alliance in support of James Tomkinson, the Liberal candidate for Eddisbury was meant 
to show how the Liberal party supported the cause of temperance. At this meeting several 
speakers including Gladstone, Wilfrid Lawson, MP Canon Baker, and James Tomkinson 
himself extolled the virtues of the Liberal party. Lawson claimed that the Conservative 
party felt that any temperance measures impeded upon the individual liberties of the 
people, and as such would not support those measures as a party. Thus, according to 
Lawson and the other speakers “The Liberal part alone supported temperance 
legislation.”278 In this meeting the Liberal party spokesmen speak directly to supporters 
of a major pressure group in Britain at the time and urge them to support the Liberal party 
as they are the only party to take their concerns into account. This is a clear distinction 
from earlier political discourse in which the major emphasis was placed on the personal 
qualifications of candidates for Parliament and shows how the Third Reform Act creates 
a political atmosphere in which candidates and political parties must be more active in 
appealing to the will of their constituencies. 
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 In conclusion, the ratification of the Third Reform Act had significant impacts on 
social and political pressure groups in the closing decades of the Victorian era. During 
these years pressure groups were able to exert much more influence in government and 
bring attention to and action for their causes in Parliament. This has been seen through 
Chamberlain’s adoption of policies advocated by the Liberation Society and National 
Education League in his Radical Programme. In the years before the Third Reform Act, 
politicians did not have to show as much consideration for the will of the people, as 
expressed through pressure groups. However, in a system in which only one member was 
returned from each constituency, it became much more pressing to adhere to the wishes 
of the voters. This resulted in a system in which pressure groups were able to exert more 
influence in the shaping of policy. 
 The Third Reform Act also created a system in which those wishing to represent 
the people in Parliament had to speak directly to the wishes of the majority. This had 
previously not been the case, as men wishing to stand for election tended to instead extoll 
their own virtues. After the franchise expansion and seat redistribution of 1884-5 this 
system was no longer electorally viable. Again, with each constituency only returning 
one member it was vital that those wishing to be elected appeal to popular opinion. Thus, 
candidates spoke more openly on political issues, and associated themselves and their 
parties with those issues. 
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CHAPTER VI  
 
 
ECONOMIC PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE THIRD REFORM ACT 
 
 
 Much like the social and economic pressure groups that came to exert significant 
influence over government and popular opinion in the years following the passing of the 
Third Reform Act, economic pressure groups were an important aspect of late-Victorian 
politics.279 Several of these groups advocated for action from the government in many 
arenas of public life that were similar to those of the social and political pressure groups, 
albeit for different reasons. Among those causes taken up by both economic and 
sociopolitical pressure groups was the cause of religious reform, which was important to 
economic pressure groups, although their reason for wanting to see the disestablishment 
of the Church of England was the abolition of the Church rate, which many viewed as an 
unfair taxation rather than the issue of education reform called for by Radical 
Nonconformists.280 Similarly, the debate over temperance adopted an economic tone 
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when discussing specific legislation. This is especially true in 1890, as discussion of a 
Drink Bill was taking place in Parliament. As one Radical newspaperman puts it: 
For many weighty reasons the question is not one that can be decided offhand 
by cut-and-dried resolutions passed at hastily-convened meetings. The 
financial difficulties that surround it preclude precipitate treatment. There are 
economic rights, quite apart from those real or supposed, of the ordinary 
license-holders that must be duly considered. That, for instance, the rights of 
mortgagees, which have always been dealt with tenderly by the law, and 
which form so important a factor in the present licensing controversy: there is 
no getting away from the fact that rights have been legally acquired, and as 
such are entitled to legal protection.281 
 
There were many in Britain who advocated against temperance reform as their ability to 
sell liquor and other alcoholic beverages was their primary livelihood, there was also 
those on the other side of the debate who advocated for tempered reform through the 
local option, partly due to fears that any temperance bill would fail without such a 
measure, as such a drastic measure would alienate those who depended on the urban 
working-classes for electoral support. Such a move shows the level of influence that 
economic pressure groups were able to exert over the government. This is demonstrated 
in the case of the Trades Union Congress’ advocacy against the influx of immigrants in 
the late 1890s. The TUC successfully lobbied Parliament to create commission to study 
the effects of immigration and ultimately result in the Aliens Act of 1905 which 
expanded the circumstances under which aliens could be denied entry into Britain.282 
 This can also be seen through pressure groups that were primarily concerned with 
the influx of immigrant labor into the industrial centers of Britain in the closing decades 
of the Victorian period. These pressure groups, primarily made up of urban working-class 
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men, sought government action to curtail the patterns of immigration, as they claimed 
that it took jobs away from able-bodied British men. These sentiments were expressed at 
an 1892 TUC meeting by Mr. J Wilson MP, the Chairman on the Parliamentary 
Committee of the TUC. According to the Aberdeen Journal: 
He afterwards spoke of the necessity for land reform and against foreign 
immigration, stating that the door must be shut against the enormous 
immigration of destitute aliens into this country. Briefly, these foreigners, 
driven out of their own county or countries of their adoption, fled here, and 
took work at any price. The tailoring and kindred trades, particularly in large 
centres of population, had been practically ruined, until one ceased to wonder 
why sweating flourished.283 
 
This shows a clear link between the government, pressure groups, and the economy. The 
Trades Union Congress, which was the largest trade union at the time, claiming to 
represent over one and a quarter million workers, was openly advocating for a cessation 
of foreign immigration with the aim of aiding British workers, and had support, as 
indicated by Mr. Wilson’s comments, from some members of Parliament, particularly 
Conservative MPs, for whom patriotic nationalism was a central ideological tenet.284 
 Perhaps the most significant impact of economic pressure groups on the political 
landscape of the late Victorian period, however, was that of the debate over imperial 
preference and tariff reform. It was here that several pressure groups converged over a 
single issue, the matter of Britain’s faltering economy when compared with those of the 
United States and Germany. Joseph Chamberlain, the erstwhile champion of the Radical 
Programme introduced a plan of tariff reform and imperial preference in to Parliament in 
the early twentieth century that was met with intense opposition from several sectors of 
the population and from government itself. Although Chamberlain’s tariff reform 
                                                          
283 “The Trades Union Congress,” Aberdeen Weekly Journal, 7 September 1892. 
284 Roberts, The Trades Union Congress, 182. 
84 
 
 
 
campaign ultimately failed, it gave perhaps the greatest showcase of political pressure by 
economic interests in the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods. It was roundly opposed 
by those interests who supported free trade, which had been the status-quo since the 
repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and ushered in the resurgence of the Liberal party in 
1906.285 Thus, through the campaign to defeat Chamberlain’s tariff reform program, 
economic pressure groups demonstrated that they were able to have an impactful 
influence upon government. 
 This influence, and its impact, will be measured in two ways throughout this 
chapter.  First will be a discussion of the success these pressure groups had pressuring the 
government to action in the years follow the implementation of the Third Reform Act. 
The franchise expansion measures of the Third Reform Act created a greatly expanded 
electorate, with the most significant gains coming in the counties. Naturally, this created 
a more democratic electoral process, with the will of the majority becoming more readily 
apparent. To remain electorally viable, the two major political parties had to appeal to 
public opinion for support. It is here that it will be shown that pressure groups exerted 
their greatest influence. Acting as agents for public opinion, these economic groups 
pressured government for change. Eager to bolster their own power in Parliament, MPs 
from both parties incorporated the desires of these groups into their political platforms in 
election years and promised the change that the pressure groups sought. The second way 
that the influence of economic pressure groups will be measured in this chapter is through 
the changing dialogue of politicians themselves. In an era of democratic politics, 
especially with a greatly expanded working-class electorate, it was necessary for MPs to 
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change the ways in which they interacted with their constituencies. The days of ‘man 
over measure’ politics were gone and in their place was a new system in which public 
opinion ruled. Political dialogue of the late-Victorian period was characterized by direct 
appeals to reform measures such as limits on immigration to protect working-class jobs in 
Britain.286 In this manner the influence of economic pressure groups can be measured by 
observing how their demands are incorporated into the speeches of MPs and candidates 
standing for election in the years following the Third Reform Act. By combining these 
two methods of measuring the success of economic pressure groups this chapter will 
show that the Third Reform Act created a significant change in the relationship between 
government and the people, creating a more democratic system. 
 Before a discussion of these economic pressure groups can take place however, it 
is important to review the existing literature on the topic to gain an understanding of how 
scholarship has developed in regard to it. Looking again to Adelman, one can see an 
interpretation that points towards the Conservative party commitment to tariff reform as a 
driving factor behind the Liberal party resurgence in 1906.287 However, Adelman does 
not explicitly credit pressure groups for influencing either the Conservative party to 
support tariff reform or the Liberal party to reject tariff reform in favor of free trade. He 
does explain that the Liberal party favored free trade and an expansion of social reform 
and its associated government spending, but again, there is no mention of pressure groups 
being a factor in these developments.288 While it could be argued that Adelman implies 
through his work that pressure groups play a major role in these developments, without 
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an explicit statement indicating as such, the reader should not assume this to be the case. 
As it stands, Adelman’s work reads as a more traditional account of Radical politics with 
an emphasis on the Radicals in Parliament and not those who empowered them.  
 Pat Thane takes a more direct approach to his assessment of economic reform and 
pressure groups in the late Victorian period. Writing of the trade union fight for fair 
wages and the Liberal campaign to protect the free trade system, he shows a more direct 
link between pressure groups as representative of popular opinion and actions taken by 
the government.289 Through his writing Thane shows the value of organized pressure in 
advocating for government action. Writing in the same collection of essays, John 
Shepherd echoes the sentiments of Thane, going so far as to argue that the TUC was 
responsible for the formation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC). He shows 
the TUC organizing campaigns to take the initiative on industrial matters before 
Parliament and collaborating with the newly-formed LRC on measures like 
unemployment and old age pensions, and campaigns against the 1902 Education Bill and 
Chamberlain’s tariff reform programme. As Shepherd sees it, the growing rapprochement 
of the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC and Liberal politicians led to a period of 
strong Liberal politics in the early twentieth century.290 This claim from Shepherd is a 
strong one in favor of economic pressure groups being incredibly influential over the 
government in the late-Victorians and Edwardian periods.  
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 In perhaps the greatest work on the impact of economic pressure groups in the 
late-Victorian period E.H.H. Green discusses Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign at 
considerable length. In his work Green shows an undeniable link between economic 
pressure groups and the campaign for tariff reform. When discussing the support that 
Chamberlain had for tariff reform, Green quotes J.L. Harvin’s Imperial Reciprocity, in 
which Harvin proclaims ‘1846 is not 1903’. Green explains that this means that the issues 
raised by the 1903 tariff campaign are completely different from those surrounding the 
debate over the Corn Law repeal in the 1840s. While the 1846 Corn Law debate had been 
primarily a question of Free Trade or Protectionism, Chamberlain’s tariff reform 
campaign brought a new set of questions to the fore.291 
Green goes on to explain that Chamberlain, supported by the Tariff Reform 
League, appealed to British agricultural interests to back his tariff reform program. This 
shows that by the early twentieth century politicians could use their ability to appeal to 
public opinion as another tool to encourage the passage of legislation in Parliament, as 
Chamberlain tries to do through the Tariff Reform League’s attempt to appeal to 
agricultural interests, which had long been the leading economic power in Britain. 
 These economic pressure groups had significant success in pressuring the 
government to action on causes that were important to them. This can be seen first 
through the inclusion of the local option in temperance legislation. This local option 
would allow for locally elected boards in each constituency to determine whether alcohol 
would be sold in that locality, and the manner in which it would be sold.292 Temperance 
legislation was initially included in the Liberal platform as a way to gain the support of 
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‘faddists,’ Nonconformists who tended to favor more radical social reform measures. 
These reforms were unpopular with the majority of the Anglican urban-working class, 
who viewed the drink as an integral part of their ‘Englishness,’ and of course with those 
who sold alcohol. This disdain for temperance reform is evident in speeches made at the 
Licensed Victuallers Dinner held in Fishponds Bristol. In these speeches, those taking the 
podium decried temperance legislation as robbery of both their livelihood and liberties. In 
a speech recorded by The Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, this sentiment is explained by 
J.W. Plunkett MP as he remarks “When a man carried on a lawful trade it was unlawful 
to rob him of that trade. That was so before the new plan of robbing everybody of 
everybody’s rights existed.” In the minds of Plunkett and the other present at this 
meeting, the only way to protect the rights and livelihoods of the licensed victuallers and 
beer retailers was to include a measure allowing for the local option in any potential drink 
bill that may come in the future. 
 This disdain for temperance legislation was not limited to only one organization 
in the suburbs of Bristol. Rather, this was a sentiment that was shared by many publicans 
and beer retailers throughout Britain. In the years immediately following the Third 
Reform Act meetings were held across the country to discuss the possible implications of 
a drink bill. In all of these meetings, the idea of temperance legislation brought about 
much consternation from interested parties. The organizations favoring maintenance of 
the status-quo regarding temperance pledged to bolster their ranks and do everything 
possible to fight the implementation of any drink bill and agreed that at the very least a 
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local option measure would be a requirement for any such bill introduced into 
Parliament.293 
 This agitation in favor of the local option influenced the shaping of temperance 
legislation. In the years following the Third Reform Act, calls for the local option became 
progressively more imperious and difficult for government to ignore.294 This was 
evidenced by the indication from Gladstone in 1889 that it was his conviction that any 
temperance bill forthcoming from Parliament must of necessity include a local option 
measure.295 What this shows is that through the pressure they placed on government to 
act in their favor, these interest groups were able to shape legislation. This led to a shift 
from stricter temperance bills to more moderate bills dependent on locally elected boards 
to control the sale of alcohol. The sheer level of agitation and demonstration against the 
notion of temperance legislation also led Parliament to fail to enact any significant 
temperance measures, as the United Kingdom Alliance lamented in their 1894 annual 
report.296 
 The influence of economic pressure groups can further be seen through their 
efforts to curtail foreign immigration into Britain in the late Victorian period. Although 
there were some who felt that the influx of foreign workers was unproblematic, the 
opinion of many among the urban working-class was that these aliens were lowering the 
average wages of workers in Britain by accepting work at lower wages than native British 
workers were willing to do.297 This sentiment was expressed in the annual meeting of 
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organized labor delegates in Glasgow when the President of that assembly, a Mr. Hodge, 
expressed his belief that: 
the door must be shut against the enormous immigration of destitute aliens 
into this country. Foreigners driven out of their own country fled here. They 
took work at any price – poverty-stricken themselves, they brought poverty to 
others.298 
 
This same sentiment was echoed almost verbatim across the United Kingdom, indicating 
that the desire to curb immigration was widespread, at least among the urban working-
classes.299  
Ultimately, the sentiment against immigrant workers and the efforts of economic 
pressure groups in urging the government to pass measures to protect British labor 
resulted in the introduction of an Alien Immigration Bill into Parliament by Mr. 
Ritchie.300 This bill served two purposes: first to curtail the influx of immigrant labor into 
Britain, especially London, and second to endear the Conservative party to the urban 
working-class, as many Liberal party MPs said they would not support the bill. 
 The second method of measuring the influence of economic pressure groups can 
be done by examining the immigration issue as well. The Conservative Prime Minister of 
the time, Lord Salisbury, speaks directly about the importance of implementing 
immigration measures to shore up Conservative party support amongst the working class 
in an interview with Mr. White. According to Lord Salisbury, “I am very anxious to pass 
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an Alien Immigration Bill and I believe that it would be valuable and much demanded by 
the working classes in many districts.”301 
Although this bill was ultimately not successful, the fact that Lord Salisbury spoke on it 
so candidly, especially with regards to its benefits for the working classes shows that it 
was important for politicians to vocally support causes supported by public opinion, as 
evidenced through interest groups. On the opposite side of this support was the failure of 
H.H. Asquith and Henry Campbell-Bannerman to support a second Alien Immigration 
Bill in the early twentieth century. Their failure to support measures called for by public 
opinion was one of the main causes for the continued electoral woes of the Liberal party 
in the twentieth century prior to 1906.302 
 This importance for politicians to speak directly to their constituencies about 
measures that affected them was further seen through Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff 
reform. During this campaign Chamberlain traveled across Britain speaking to audiences 
urging support of his plan for tariff reform and imperial preference. Beginning in 
September 1903 in Glasgow, Chamberlain engaged in a nationwide propaganda 
campaign with stops in Newcastle, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, and other major 
industrial centers supported by the Imperial Tariff League, which sought to bring tariff 
reform to fruition.303 This speaking tour was further accompanied by a call for new 
subscribers to the Tariff Reform League. Specifically, Chamberlain and the Duke of 
Sutherland were looking for one thousand new supporters, each willing to contribute 
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£100 to the League’s coffers to support the distribution of ‘millions of pamphlets’ 
through League offices throughout the country.304 Such a dedicated propaganda 
campaign and speaking tour shows the importance of speaking directly to the currents of 
public opinion. The supporters of tariff reform also make an effort to combat the 
assumptions of their opponents, as evidenced by a letter from Sir Herbert Maxwell, MP 
published in The Aberdeen Journal. In his letter, composed as a response to a 
correspondent questioning the wisdom of tariff reform, Maxwell states: 
Dear sir, -- In reply to your first question, I can only say that I have every 
confidence in Mr Chamberlain’s assurance that he will be no party to any 
scheme which is likely to increase the cost of food generally. He has pointed 
out in Glasgow the outlines of a tariff which, if it should slightly raise the 
price of wheat and corn (which it is far from certain that it would) would 
diminish the price of other food stuffs of universal consumption, such as tea, 
coffee, cocoa, etc. I so not share Sir Edward Grey’s fears that preferential 
trading would diminish the wages of agricultural labourers in this country, 
nor can I understand the source from which those fears arise. Opponents of 
tariff reform cannot have it both ways. Either the taxation of of foreign 
foodstuffs will raise the price in this country, in which case there will be 
more remunerative employment upon the land, or it will leave the price 
unchanged, in which case farm labourers will continue to receive better value 
for their labour than that class have ever received until recent years.305 
 
The extent to which Chamberlain and his supporters go to appeal to the working-classes 
through their assurances that tariff reform will not cause an increase in food costs but will 
instead improve their quality of life demonstrates the importance of appealing to public 
opinion, especially of the working-classes, in the years following the Third Reform Act. 
 To conclude, economic interest groups had a considerable impact on political 
activity in the years following the Third Reform Act. The enfranchisement of the rural 
working-classes and the general redistribution of seats in Parliament created a more 
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democratic political system in which public opinion was more influential than had 
previously been the case. As such, interest groups became an important tool in the 
shaping of policy by holding government accountable for implementing measures that the 
electorate wanted. This can be seen through the introduction of a local option measure to 
discussions of temperance and the introduction of bills to curtail foreign immigration and 
protect British workers. Pressure groups also influenced the way that politicians 
interacted with their constituencies, by forcing them to abandon the ‘man over measures’ 
model of political discourse and instead adopt one in which public opinion was much 
more valuable. This is evident in Chamberlain’s 1903 campaign for imperial preference 
in which he made a tour of Britain speaking in favor of his measures, supported by the 
Tariff Reform League’s pamphlet and propaganda campaign. In this new political 
system, which was made possible by the Third Reform Act, political discourse and 
interaction became more democratic, with politicians and the public both playing a role in 
the creation of policy. 
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CHAPTER VII  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The Third Reform Act dramatically altered the political landscape of late 
Victorian Britain. The Act doubled the size of the electorate by extending the 1867 
franchise reform into the boroughs and redistributed parliamentary seats by breaking up 
old multi-seat constituencies and introducing new single-member districts. The result of 
these measures was to create a political system which was more democratic than had 
been the case under the 1832 or 1867 Reform Acts. The division of previously multi-
member constituencies into single-member constituencies allowed for more concise 
electoral battles between Liberals and Conservatives, as well as inter-party conflicts. The 
increased electorate and redistributed parliamentary seats of the Third Reform Act 
bolstered political activity and organization across all classes, and saw public opinion 
play a greatly enhanced role in electoral politics in the late-Victorian and Edwardian 
periods. 
 The effects of the Third Reform Act were widespread and felt throughout a wide 
spectrum of late Victorian politics. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties were 
affected by the altered political landscape, as the redistribution of seats created a system 
in which elections were more closely contested by both parties and appeals to public 
opinion became necessary to win elections. The Liberal party was unable to effectively 
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adapt to this new landscape, and as such was relegated to electoral irrelevance in the two 
decades following the Third Reform Act. The Conservative party on the other hand 
embraced the increased political activity and organization that came with franchise 
expansion and seat redistribution and saw twenty years of political domination.  
The Third Reform Act also affected the Irish Home Rule movement. Gladstone’s 
need to maintain Liberal power led him to endorse Home Rule openly in the years 
following the Third Reform Act in an attempt to create a coalition with the Parnellite 
Irish Nationalists. However, this move had the opposite result, and led to many Liberal 
MPs deserting the party over their refusal to support the Home Rule measure suggested 
by Gladstone. This ideological refusal to support Irish Home Rule, and the increased 
importance of popular opinion in the years following the Third Reform Act led to the 
formation of the Liberal Unionists. By jumping from the Liberal party ship to that of the 
Liberal Unionists, MPs appealed to their constituencies by advocating for social reform 
measures and the maintenance of the British Empire, which was a popular sentiment at 
the time. 
The Third Reform Act’s impact on pressure groups is also significant in the two 
decades following the implementation of the Act. While it is true that pressure groups 
existed prior to 1884, it was in the final two decades of the nineteenth century that their 
influence was felt to the fullest extent. These pressure groups were an easily recognizable 
outlet of public opinion and served to both expand the arena of government and to 
increase public participation in government. 
In chapter two the Conservative ascendancy, and how it was affected by the Third 
Reform Act, was discussed at length. In the 1886 election the Conservative party won a 
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landslide victory against the Liberal party and ushered in a twenty-year period of 
Conservative party hegemony. The changes in the political landscape brought about by 
the Third Reform Act created the need for an advanced political organization and more 
active efforts to persuade the working-classes to support the Conservative party. This was 
done by a concerted effort on the part of Conservative party organization to appeal to 
new constituencies while maintaining their support from the traditional power bases. The 
middle-class remained a stronghold of Conservative party power because of Conservative 
party efforts to present themselves as the defenders of property. This helped bring urban 
industrialists into the conservative fold, as they viewed the Conservative party as being 
most likely to protect their interests. The working-class was incorporated into the 
Conservative party following the implementation of the Third Reform Act because of an 
active Conservative party effort to appeal to the new voters. This was accomplished 
through associating the Conservative party with aspects of urban working-class culture 
such as leisure and the drink. This is seen through the establishment of Conservative 
party social clubs. The Leamington Spa Courier and Warwickshire Standard reported 
that in the years immediately following the Third Reform Act, Conservative organization 
had been extended extensively towards the middle and working-classes.306 The 
Conservative party also defended the status quo of the Anglican Church, as the working-
class was wooed by stability. The stability was also emphasized by appealing to the self-
interest of the working-class. By presenting itself as the defender of the British Empire, 
the Conservative party was able to portray an image of a party concerned with protecting 
British industrial interests, which in turn meant that industrial workers would be able to 
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enjoy regular employment and competitive wages. Thus, the Conservative ascendancy of 
1886-1906 was not merely a passive benefit of the disintegration of the Liberal party due 
to its own ineptitude. Instead, a more nuanced view of the Conservative ascendancy is 
required. One in which the split of the Liberal party and its ineptitude in appealing to its 
electoral base provided a passive benefit upon which the Conservative Party made an 
active effort to build a base of support and solidify their electoral relevance. 
Chapter three analyzed the role of the Third Reform Act in the disintegration and 
split of the Liberal party. This disintegration was caused by several factors, not least of 
which was Gladstone’s support for Irish Home Rule. This move was unpalatable to many 
in the party, and directly led to the formation of the Liberal Unionist party as many 
Liberal, including Joseph Chamberlain and George Goschen. However, even before this 
final split the Liberal party had been in decline. This decline was evident following the 
1885 general election, which left them dependent on the Parnellites to maintain their 
control over government. This election, and the 1886 election which saw them lose 
power and much of their prestige, were indicative of the Liberal party problem in the era 
of the Third Reform Act. The party was unable to appeal to effectively organize or appeal 
to public opinion in a way that persuaded voters to prefer Liberal candidates. As such, 
working-class conservatism played a significant role in the Conservative party’s success 
in the late-Victorian period.307 To gain the support of those working-class voters the 
Conservative party deliberately associated themselves with aspects of urban society like 
the pub, racing, and football to distinguish themselves from the moral reforming Liberal 
party.308 This was done through the founding of political clubs, which put as much 
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emphasis on organizing parties and socials as they did on organizing voter registration 
drives.309 Doing this ingratiated the Conservative party with the newly enfranchised 
urban working-class electorate, while gradually familiarizing them with political 
organization and participation. Perhaps the most important aspect of this campaign to 
gain the support of the urban working-class was the Conservative party’s defense of the 
drink. Working-class identity was closely associated with the pub, and as such their 
politics revolved heavily around the ‘beer barrel.’310 While the Liberal party was 
dedicated to its ‘crusade against sin,’ the Conservative party dedicated itself to defense of 
drink and popular sport, elements which were vital to the identity of the urban working-
class.311 
Chapter four explored the impact of the Third Reform Act on the Irish Home Rule 
Crisis. The Third Reform Act created a political system in which political parties were 
more dependent on effective organization for electoral success. As a result of the 
redistribution of seats in parliament and the extension of the franchise, this meant that the 
Irish MPs held the balance of power in Parliament. Irish Home Rule was thrust to the fore 
of British politics by these political machines, which leveraged popular democratic 
sentiment, especially in Ireland, for the creation of Home Rule measures. The importance 
of this development is two-fold. First, it saw the evolution of British politics from a game 
of “man over measures” in which MPs were elected based on their personal integrity to a 
system in which candidates had to pay more attention to the opinions of their people. 
Second, the development of the caucus finally gave rank-and-file party members an 
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opportunity to shape party policy rather than accept the party line dictated to them by the 
party elites. Although the NLF initially followed Gladstone’s policy religiously, by the 
1890s it was in a position to dictate party policy. These developments were in line with 
the longstanding ideals of popular democracy that were responsible for the passage of the 
Third Reform Act. 
Chapter five looked at the interconnectedness of the Third Reform Act and 
socioeconomic pressure groups in the final decades of the nineteenth century.  The 
ratification of the Third Reform Act had significant impacts on social and political 
pressure groups in the closing decades of the Victorian era. During these years pressure 
groups were able to exert much more influence in government and bring attention to and 
action for their causes in Parliament. This has been seen through Chamberlain’s adoption 
of policies advocated by the Liberation Society and National Education League in his 
Radical Programme. In the years before the Third Reform Act, politicians did not have to 
show as much consideration for the will of the people, as expressed through pressure 
groups. However, in a system in which only one member was returned from each 
constituency, it became much more pressing to adhere to the wishes of the voters. This 
resulted in a system in which pressure groups were able to exert more influence in the 
shaping of policy. 
The Third Reform Act also created a system in which those wishing to represent 
the people in Parliament had to speak directly to the wishes of the majority. This had 
previously not been the case, as men wishing to stand for election tended to instead extoll 
their own virtues. After the franchise expansion and seat redistribution of 1884-5 this 
system was no longer electorally viable. Again, with each constituency only returning 
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one member it was vital that those wishing to be elected appeal to popular opinion. Thus, 
candidates spoke more openly on political issues, and associated themselves and their 
parties with those issues. 
Chapter six discussed the role that economic pressure groups played in the years 
following the implementation of the Third Reform Act. The enfranchisement of the rural 
working-classes and the general redistribution of seats in Parliament created a more 
democratic political system in which public opinion was more influential than had 
previously been the case. As such, interest groups became an important tool in the 
shaping of policy by holding government accountable for implementing measures that the 
electorate wanted. This can be seen through the introduction of a local option measure to 
discussions of temperance and the introduction of bills to curtail foreign immigration and 
protect British workers. Pressure groups also influenced the way that politicians 
interacted with their constituencies, by forcing them to abandon the ‘man over measures’ 
model of political discourse and instead adopt one in which public opinion was much 
more valuable. This is evident in Chamberlain’s 1903 campaign for imperial preference 
in which he made a tour of Britain speaking in favor of his measures, supported by the 
Tariff Reform League’s pamphlet and propaganda campaign. In this new political 
system, which was made possible by the Third Reform Act, political discourse and 
interaction became more democratic, with politicians and the public both playing a role in 
the creation of policy. 
Ultimately, the Third Reform Act created a political system in Britain that was 
more democratic than had been the case after either the 1832 or 1867 Reform Acts. While 
it is accurate to argue that true democracy did not come about until the interwar period, 
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the impacts of the Third Reform Act must not be overlooked. The division of previously 
multi-member constituencies into single-member constituencies allowed for more concise 
electoral battles between Liberals and Conservatives, as well as inter-party conflicts. The 
increased electorate and redistributed parliamentary seats of the Third Reform Act 
bolstered political activity and organization across all classes, and saw public opinion 
play a greatly enhanced role in electoral politics in the late-Victorian and Edwardian 
periods. Thus, the years following the Third Reform Act were more democratic than 
those preceding it. This more democratic system created a Conservative ascendancy, 
which saw the Conservative party take power following the 1886 general election and 
remain in power for the next generation. 
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Pugh’s work is a general political history of Britain from the French Revolution 
through the leadership of Tony Blair in the late twentieth century. This work has 
been useful as a reference for major political developments throughout the 
Victorian era, especially the political reforms of 1867 and 1884.  
Roberts, B. C. The Trades Union Congress, 1868-1921. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1958. 
 Roberts’s work is a history of the Trades Union Congress from the Second 
Reform Act until just after the First World War. The Trades Union Congress 
(TUC) was the largest labor union in Britain at the time, and as such was also the 
largest interest group. This work was useful to my research because it gave me 
valuable insight into how economic interest groups petitioned government in the 
years following the Third Reform Act. 
Saunders, Robert. Democracy and the Vote in British Politics 1848-1867: The Making 
of the Second Reform Act. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. 
 Saunders’s work analyzed the Second Reform Act and the role that democracy 
played in the implementation of that reform. This work was useful to my research 
as it provided both a narrative for the Second Reform Act, which formed the 
political system altered by the Third Reform Act, and by establishing an argument 
that public opinion became more important as more citizens were given the 
franchise. 
Shepherd, John. “Labour and Parliament: The Lib-Labs as the first Working-class 
MPs, 1885-1906.” in Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised 
Labour and Party Politics, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 While this work did not play a large role in my research, it did provide some 
insight into working-class politics. As the working-class became a larger portion 
of the British electorate, Shepherd argued that the Liberal-Labour alliance played 
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an important role in ensuring representation for the working class and served as a 
forerunner to the Labour party. 
Thane, Pat “Labour and Local Politics: Radicalism, Democracy, and Social Reform 
1880-1914.” in Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour 
and Party Politics, ed. Eugenio F. Biagini and Alastair J. Reid. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 Thane’s work shows the importance of local politics and party organization to the 
major political parties in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods. In this chapter, 
Thane discussed the role of democracy and public opinion in social reform. 
Tholfsen, Trygve. Working Class Radicalism in Mid-Victorian England. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977. 
 Tolfsen’s work provides a narrative of political radicalism amongst the working-
classes in Victorian Britain. While this work is a valuable overview of working-
class radicalism, it was especially useful for my purposes as Tholfsen gives 
insights on the effects of working-class considerations on the Irish Home Rule 
question. 
Thompson, Andrew S. Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932. 
New York: Routledge, 2014. 
 Thompson provides an overview of the role the British Empire played in politics 
in the late Victorian period into the twentieth century. Thompson spent 
considerable effort discussing the role of the Boer War on British politics, and he 
argues that a more nuanced approach than the status quo is necessary. According 
to Thompson the anti-imperialist movement did not gain much momentum from 
the Boer War, as had previously been thought. 
Wright, D. G. Popular Radicalism: The Working-Class Experience 1780-1880. 
London: Longman, 1988. 
 Wright’s work is an overview of the working-class role in radical politics for most 
of the nineteenth century. Although Wright’s narrative ends before the period 
discussed in my thesis, his work is useful for my analysis of public opinion and 
the role of working-class activism in the Liberal party before the Third Reform 
Act. 
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Aidt, Toke S., and Raphaël Franck. "Democratization Under the Threat of 
Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832." Econometrica 83, 
no. 2 (2015): 505-47.  
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 This work examines the link between parliamentary reform and the risk of 
political revolution in 1830s Britain. An empirical analysis of the riots that 
occurred near British constituencies showed that British voters were persuaded to 
vote for pro-reform politicians after seeing the violence of the Swing Riots 
firsthand. This article is useful for placing the process of democratization within a 
broader context of the nineteenth century. 
 
Belcher, Jason. "Gladstonian Liberalism: A Catalyst for Social Representation and 
Democratic Reform in Victorian Britain" (2018). Electronic Thesis 
Collection. 244.  
 
 Belcher’s thesis discusses Gladstone’s legacy and achievements as leader of 
Parliament and the treatment he has received by subsequent historians. Belcher 
argues that Gladstone should not be considered a democratic revolutionary, but 
that he did implement some elements of democratic change in his reforms. 
Belcher’s analysis of Gladstone was useful to my research into Gladstone’s 
motivations for supporting Irish Home Rule in the 1880s. 
 
Blaxill, Luke. “Electioneering, the Third Reform Act, and Political Change in the 
1880s,” Parliamentary History 30, no 3. (2011): 343-373. 
 
 This article uses the borough of Ipswich as a focus to discuss the changes in the 
process of electioneering in the year immediately following the Third Reform 
Act. Blaxill argues that historians have underestimated the extent to which the 
Third Reform Act transformed the political culture. He further argues that the 
Third Reform Act had the unintended consequence of nationalizing politics. 
 
Chadwick, Mary. “The Role of Redistribution in the Making of the Third Reform 
Act,” The Historical Journal 19, no. 3 (1976): 665-683. 
 
 In this article Mary Chadwick argues that the Third Reform Act was the most 
significant of the three franchise reform acts during the nineteenth century, 
despite receiving the least attention from historians. In her work, Chadwick 
argues that what sets the Third Reform Act apart from the other two acts was its 
focus on redistribution. 
 
Clayton, Huw. “How Not to Run a Campaign: The Failure of the Unionist Free 
Traders, 1903-6,” Parliamentary History 30, no. 2 (2011): 158-174. 
 
 Clayton’s article provides an analysis of the failure of Chamberlain’s tariff reform 
campaign in the early twentieth century. This tariff reform campaign was 
designed to implement a system of imperial preference, which went against the 
status quo of free trade. Clayton’s article argues that the Liberal Unionists failed 
to understand mass politics, and as such the tariff reform campaign failed and the 
Liberal Unionists lost seats in the 1906 election. 
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Ertman, Thomas. “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and British Democratization,” 
Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 8-9 (2010): 1000-1022. 
 
 This article focuses on the period of political change around the First Reform Act. 
This period began with Catholic Emancipation, but eventually culminated in 
political reform for the entirety of Britain. Ertman argues that this period had a 
threefold impact on the political order by removing executive control of the 
legislative, brought a two-party system, and served as a catalyst for future 
reforms. 
  
Fraser, P. "The Liberal Unionist Alliance: Chamberlain, Hartington, and the 
Conservatives, 1886-1904," The English Historical Review 77, no. 302 (1962): 
53-78. 
  
An account of the Liberal Unionist party and Chamberlain’s transition from 
Liberal, to Liberal Unionist, to Conservative. Gives context into the shifting 
ideological bases of the two parties following the Third Reform Act. This article 
shows how Conservative efforts to reform convinced Chamberlain and other 
Liberal leaders that the Conservative party was better upholding principles of 
liberalism. 
 
Hamer, D. A. "The Irish Question and Liberal Politics, 1886-1894," The Historical 
Journal 12, no. 3 (1969): 511-32.  
 
 This article gives an overview of the Irish Home Rule question in the final two 
decades of the nineteenth century. Hamer argues that the Irish Question occupied 
a place of political predominance in the closing decades of the Victorian period. 
Hamer gives valuable insight into the importance of Irish Home Rule to 
Gladstone and to the Liberal party. 
 
Kelly, Matthew. “Home Rule for Ireland: For and Against,” The Historian 124 
(Winter 201/2015): 30-36. 
 
 Kelly’s work provides an introductory overview of the major arguments both for 
and against Irish Home Rule and discusses the groups who supported both sides. 
This work was useful for setting my argument and gaining a basic understanding 
of the main sides of the Irish Question 
 
Kneale, James. “The Place of Drink: Temperance and the Public, 1856-1914,” Social 
& Cultural Geography 2, no. 1 (2001): 43-59. 
 
 In his treatment of temperance in Britain during the Victorian period, Kneale 
argues that rather than continuing their efforts at reforming individuals the United 
Kingdom Alliance instead shifted their efforts towards outright banning alcohol. 
This wider scope of activity for a faddist pressure group is used to show the 
effects of the Third Reform Act. 
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Lawrence, Jon. "Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-
1914," The English Historical Review 108, no. 428 (1993): 629-652. 
  
An exploration of the role that social class and gender played in popular 
Conservatism in the late-Victorian period. This article, like Lawrence’s other 
work, provides an account of politics from below. This article is useful in the 
historiographical discussion of the Conservative ascendance, as it suggests that 
Conservatives regained power through their own efforts. 
 
Lubenow, W. C. "Irish Home Rule and the Social Basis of the Great Separation in 
the Liberal Party in 1886," The Historical Journal 28, no. 1 (1985): 125-142. 
 
An account of the Liberal split in 1886. Lubenow contends that it was political 
reasons rather than social reasons that led to the Liberal split. This article is useful 
to my research as the Conservative ascendancy begins in part with the Home Rule 
Crisis. Lubenow claims that it was easier for Liberals to defect as the two parties 
had become ideologically closer. 
 
McConnel, James. "'Jobbing with Tory and Liberal': Irish Nationalists and the 
Politics of Patronage 1880-1914," Past & Present 188, no. 1 (2005): 105-131. 
  
This article gives insight into how patronage played a role in the Irish National 
party in the late-Victorian period. This article was not particularly useful to my 
research once I switched topics but does give insight into the prominence that 
patronage played in gaining political relevance. This article could also be used to 
explain why the Irish Nationalists were in a coalition with the Conservative party 
for a short period. 
 
McEwen, John M. "The Liberal Party and the Irish Question during the First 
World War," Journal of British Studies 12, no. 1 (1972): 109-31. 
 
 In this article John McEwen asks a simple question, but one which he argues has 
not been given as much attention as it merits: How many nails did Ireland put in 
the Liberal coffin between 1914 and 1918? McEwen argues that Home Rule was 
a unifying force for the Liberal party at the outbreak of the war, but Ireland’s 
growing separatism made the prospect harder to cling to and made the Liberal 
more unpopular. 
 
Porritt, Annie G. "The Irish Home Rule Bill," Political Science Quarterly 28, no. 2 
(1913): 298-319. 
 
A near contemporary account of the Irish Home Rule movement. This article is 
useful to my research because it gives insight into the social conflict theory of 
Liberal decline and serves as a counter to my thesis. This fits into the 
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historiographical picture I am presenting, in that contemporaries ascribed to the 
belief that Conservatives came to power because of a Liberal collapse. 
 
Roberts, Matthew. "Popular Conservatism in Britain, 1832-1914," Parliamentary 
History 26, no. 3 (2007): 387-410. 
 
This article is vital to my understanding of popular Conservatism in Britain. Much  
of my argument was inspired by Roberts’ ideas and this article forms the 
backbone of my thesis. It provides an overview of Conservative efforts to appeal 
to the electorate as it expands and allows for other research to be used to support 
its main arguments. 
 
Roberts, Matthew. "'Villa Toryism' and Popular Conservatism in Leeds, 1885-
1902," The Historical Journal 49, no. 1 (2006): 217-246. 
  
This article is a localized account of popular or ‘Villa’ Toryism in the late 
Victorian period. This article is key to my arguments that the Conservatives make 
active efforts to solidify their support among the middle class. It shows how the 
Conservative party placed themselves in position to be the advocates for industry 
and property. 
 
Rodden, John.  “Neither Popes nor Potatoes: The Irish Question and the Marxist 
Answer,” The Midwest Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2009): 232-254.  
 
 Rodden’s article asserts that both Marx and Engels spent considerable debating 
the Irish Question and believed that an industrialized Ireland could be a vital force 
in their socialist revolution. However, Marx ultimately lacked a real answer for 
Ireland. Rodden argues that this topic has been largely overlooked by other 
historians and claims that Marx’s assertion that the Irish Question was a matter of 
haves vs. have nots needs more attention. 
  
Stanbridge, Karen. “Nationalism, International Factors and the ‘Irish Question’ in 
the Era of the First World War,” Nations and Nationalism 11 no. 1 (2005): 
21-42. 
 
 In this article Stanbridge considers the factors that led all players in the Irish 
Home Rule crisis to adopt policies that ultimately became irreconcilable. Part of 
this analysis is a discussion of nationalism on both the British and Irish sides, but 
the discussion of Irish nationalism and the effect it had on calls for Home Rule 
were especially useful to my research. 
 
Stephens, Hugh W. "The Changing Context of British Politics in the 1880s: The 
Reform Acts and the Formation of the Liberal Unionist Party," Social 
Science History 1, no. 4 (1977): 486-501.  
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 This article gives a narrative of the formation of the Liberal Unionist party. This 
is a subject that Stephens claims has not been given much attention from 
historians. This article is useful to the historiographical discussion of the Liberal 
Unionist party and the Third Reform Act because Stephens believes that the Third 
Reform Act caused the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives to drift together 
ideologically. This claim is countered by others such as Biagini and Lawrence. 
  
Vincent, John. "The Effect of the Second Reform Act in Lancashire," The Historical 
Journal 11, no. 1 (1968): 84-94.  
 
 This article discusses the effects of the Second Reform Act on Lancashire in the 
late 1860s. By analyzing the electoral data from 1868, Vincent seeks to ascertain 
the impact of the expanded electorate on the Conservative success in that election. 
Through analyzing the data, Vincent suggests that the expanded electorate was 
not the cause of the Conservative success but was rather previously existing 
political issues. 
